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
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With kind regards to Dr. J. G. Leitch
with W. Glapford's best compliment.

EXEMPLUM TRACTATUS

DE

FONTIBUS JURIS,

AND

OTHER LATIN PIECES OF LORD BACON;

TRANSLATED BY

JAMES GLASSFORD, ESQ.

ADVOCATE.

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
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
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THE TRANSLATOR.



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ADVERTISEMENT.

WHILE it was the great object of Lord Bacon, in commencing his Instauration of the Sciences, to point out the mistakes of those who had previously laboured in the field of learning, and to lay down what appeared to him the true *method* of inquiry, he considered it necessary, for this purpose, to examine the actual state of human knowledge and attainment ; that it might be seen what had truly been accomplished, and what branches of science had

either been cultivated imperfectly, or altogether neglected. This review forms a prominent part of those writings which he intended as the First Part of the Instauration ; namely, his Advancement of Learning, and his enlarged treatise on the same subject, written in Latin, *De Augmentis Scientiarum*. In these, after making a general distribution or division of the objects of human learning, he enters into a detail, under each head ; distinguishing what he held to be already complete ; what to be partially treated, or according to an erroneous plan ; and what to be entirely wanting. In the latter cases, he has, particularly in the work *De Augmentis*, not only stated the defect, but proceeded, in many instances, to give what he considered the most important precepts and cautions, respecting the mode of

supplying the deficiency, and farther prosecuting the subject of inquiry ; and sometimes even to exhibit portions of such treatises themselves, as examples or patterns of the works which he proposed. These examples, which are furnished in subjects differing greatly from each other, and thereby affording a variety of specimens, appear to be intended, not merely as collections or materials, which the author desired to see provided in every part of science, but as models representing the just progress of the mind, and that regular succession and order of invention, ascending and descending alternately, from which alone he expected the advancement of real learning.

The Desiderata thus noted by Bacon, and according to the order in which he has enumerated them, may be expressed as follows ; distinguishing, by

an asterisk, those of which he has, at the same time, given illustrations, either by formal examples, or by detailed and methodical precepts : viz.

Aberrations of Nature—or, a History of Unusual Productions.

Nature Subdued—or, a History of Arts.

Natural History Inductive—To serve as the Materials of Philosophy.

History of Learning.

History of Prophecy.

* *Philosophy of the Ancient Fables*.

Primary Philosophy; or, *The Trunk of Knowledge*—Comprehending the Common Axioms of all Sciences, and the Transcendental Conditions of things.

Physical or Animated Astronomy—Distinguished from Mathematical and Mechanical.

Physical Astrology—or, the Actual Influences of the Celestial Bodies.

Calendar of Natural Problems or Doubts; and *Calendar of Popular Errors*.

Doctrines of the Ancient Philosophers, collected and digested.

Doctrine of Forms, or Formal Causes—wherein the true Essences and Differences of Natures and Qualities consist.

Natural Magic—or, the Application of the doctrine of Forms to Inventions and Works.

Calendar of Inventions; or, Inventory of Man's Estate—Comprehending all Works of Nature and Art, already known and possessed by Mankind.

Calendar of Polychrestic Experiments—or, Experiments of the most universal use, and importance, for the Invention of farther Experiments.

Calendar of Human Triumphs—or, Heights and Excellencies of Human Nature.

Physiognomy of Gesture—or, Indications of the Mind from Bodily Motions.

Medical History Continued—or, Reports of Medical Cases.

Comparative Anatomy—or, Diversities of the Inward Parts and Inward Structures of Human Bodies.

Farther Inquiry of Diseases accounted Incurable.

Of the Body's Euthanasia—or, Means of Rendering Death more Easy.

Experimental Medicine—or, Authentic Medical Receipts.

Of Artificial Baths—or, Imitations of Mineral and other Medicinal Springs.

The Physician's Clue—or, Directions for the Method, Continuance, and Alternation, of Prescriptions.

* *Of the Prolongation of Life.*

Of the Substance of the Sensitive Soul—Distinguished from the Rational.

Of the Operation of the Sensitive Soul in Voluntary Motion.

Of the Difference of Perception and Sense—or, the Affections of Bodies simply, distinguished from those of Bodies Sensitive.

Of the Form and Origin of Light.

* *Sagacious Experience*; or, *Pan's Chace*—The Art of Discovery, or Use of Experience for the purposes of farther Invention.

The Process for Invention of Axioms; or, *The Interpretation of Nature*—The New Instrument, or proper Art of Induction.

* *Particular Topics*—or, Articles of Inquiry in particular Subjects and Sciences, as Suggestions for Discovery.

* *The Doctrine of Idols, or False Appearances*—viz. Exposure of the more general Sophisms or Fallacies, imposed on the Human

Judgment, by the Nature of the Mind generally, by the Nature and Custom of Individuals, and by Words, as the Instruments of Communication.

Distribution of Demonstrations—viz. The Allotment and Application of the several kinds of Proof, according to the several Sciences and Subjects.

Of the Notes of Things; or, Doctrine of Signs—Comprehending that part of Language, or the Instrument of tradition, which consists either in Natural Signs, having a similitude to the thing or notion signified, or in Real Characters, being Signs Conventional.

- * *A Philosophical Grammar; or, The Analogy of Words to Reason*—Distinguished from that which is Common or Literary, that is to say, the Grammars of Particular Languages.
- * *Delivery of the Lamp; or, The Inductive and True Method of Communicating Knowledge*—Distinguished from the Magisterial and Compendious Method of Teaching.
- * *Popular Signs and Colours of Good and Evil, Simple and Comparative*—viz. Rhetorical Sophisms, and their Confutations.
- * *Theses argued on both Sides*—or, Collection of Common Places.

Collection of the Lesser Forms of Speech—viz.

Prefaces, Conclusions, Digressions, Transitions, and the like.

Sober Satire; or, The Interior of Life—Exposition of the Frauds, Impostures, and Vices of Different Professions.

* *Georgics of the Mind; or, Moral Culture.*

* *The Learning of Negotiation; or, Civil Business*—A Directory for Different Occasions of Human Life.

* *Self Wisdom; or, The Architecture of Private Fortune*—How to rise in Life.

* *The Military Statesman; or, How to enlarge the bounds of Empire.*

* *Of Universal Justice; or, The Fountains of Right.*

Sacred Wisdom; or, The proper Use of Reason in Religion.

Of the Degrees of Union in the Ecclesiastical State—or, The Latitude and Limit of Divisions in the Church.

First Emanations of Scripture—or, A Collection of short Annotations on particular Texts of Scripture; that is to say, not systematical or strained, but detached and flowing.

Besides the illustrations which are given in the *Treatise de Augmentis*, under the particular heads marked in the foregoing catalogue, other examples and models of a similar kind, and some of them on a more extended plan, are dispersed through the author's works of Natural History and Philosophy. His whole writings, indeed, may be considered as diversified specimens, more or less exact, of a similar description, and bearing directly or indirectly on the same object.

Those pieces, of which translations are offered in the following pages, are part of the Examples contained in the work so often alluded to, *De Aug. Scient.* Of the illustrations given in that treatise, some are to be found nearly in the same form among Lord Bacon's English works, and are of course omitted in the present selection. Others are omitted on account of the imperfect state in which

they were left by the author, having been intended and reserved by him for separate treatises, but of which the plan was not afterwards accomplished *.

* The articles of the above abstract, which, though illustrated in their proper place by the author, have, for the reasons mentioned in the text, been omitted in this volume, are the following:

On the Prolongation of Life—His precepts for the prosecution of this part of science are repeated, under various heads, in his English writings, particularly his Collections for Natural History. They likewise form the subject of a separate treatise, or chapter of that history, in the Latin edition ; under the title, *Historia Vitae et Mortis*.

Pan's Chace ; or, Learned Experience.—The author's illustrations on this subject are also to be found in his Fragment of the Interpretation of Nature, and other English works ; and are repeated and enlarged in the Novum Organum.

Particular Topics ; or, Heads of Enquiry on Particular Subjects.—The example given under this part, viz. *De Gravi et Levi*, is extremely short, having been reserved for a separate work, but of which only the *aditus* or preface is to be found, consisting of a few sentences.

The Doctrine of Idols ; or, False Appearances.—This subject is treated at great length in the Novum Organum. And the summary given in the work, *De Augmentis*, is to be found, nearly in the same form, in the Second Book of the Advancement of Learning.

Philosophical Grammar.—The example of cypher, given under this head, appears either to have been left by the au-

The translator does not think it necessary to refer to preceding versions of Lord Bacon's Latin works. One of his objects has been to exhibit together, and within a moderate compass, some of those illustrations or specimens of philosophical Inquiry, which, though in one sense they are independent of each other, partake

thor in an unfinished state, or to have been imperfectly delivered by the early editors.

Traditive Lamp; or, the True Method of Communicating Knowledge.—The precepts given on this subject are to be found in the *Advancement of Learning*.

Of Popular Signs, or Colours of Good and Evil.—The examples of sophisms, under this head, are given by the author among his English works, in a fragment, having the same title, viz. *Colours of Good and Evil*.

Georgics of the Mind.—The precepts on this subject are contained nearly in the same form, and at equal length, in the Second Book of the *Advancement of Learning*.

Faber Fortunae; or, the Art of Rising in Life.—The illustrations and precepts on this head are likewise given at length in the *Advancement of Learning*.

Consul Paludatus; or, the Military Statesman. The precepts on this subject are the same with those which form his *Essay on the True Greatness of Kingdoms and Estates*. (Ess. 30.)

of the same character as to their design. This object is unconnected with the labours of preceding editors ; and could not have been accomplished with advantage, except by presenting the pieces thus selected, in translations of a uniform style. If the reception given to the present volume should be such as to encourage the translator in that design, he proposes to exhibit, in the same form, the books of the *Novum Organum* ; being that part of the *Instauratio* which was, perhaps, laboured by the author with the greatest care.

It may be observed, that the following pieces are not given according to the exact order of the original work ;—a circumstance which, in their present detached state, is evidently unimportant.

To these fragments, from the Treatise De Augmentis, is added a translation of Bacon's reflections, entitled, *Meditationes Sacræ*. They were originally published with his English Essays in 1597; and, notwithstanding their brevity, afford a specimen of the same depth and discrimination that characterize the author's mind in all his other writings.

**EXEMPLUM TRACTATUS DE JUSTITIA
UNIVERSALI, SIVE DE FONTIBUS JURIS.**

IN UNO TITULO, PER APHORISMOS.

De Aug. Scient. lib. viii. cap. 3.

**EXAMPLE OF A TREATISE ON UNIVERSAL
JUSTICE, OR THE SOURCES OF LAW.**

CONSISTING OF ONE TITLE, IN APHORISMS.

the first time in the history of the world, the
whole of the human race has been gathered
together in one place, and that is the
present meeting of the World's Fair.
The whole of the human race has been
gathered together in one place, and that is
the present meeting of the World's Fair.
The whole of the human race has been
gathered together in one place, and that is
the present meeting of the World's Fair.
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gathered together in one place, and that is
the present meeting of the World's Fair.

EXAMPLE OF A TREATISE ON UNIVERSAL JUSTICE, OR THE SOURCES OF LAW *.

INTRODUCTION.

APH. I. IN civil society, either law prevails, or force. But there is a force wearing the mask of law, and likewise a law savouring more of force than evenness of justice. There is a triple fount of injustice therefore ; mere force, crafty entanglement under pretence of law, and severity of law itself.

* In his *Advancement of Learning*, Bacon introduces this part of his subject in the following manner :

“ For the more public part of government, which is laws, I think good to note only one deficiency ; which is, that all those that have written of laws have written either as philosophers or lawyers, and none as statesmen. As for the philosophers, they

2. Private right is grounded in this manner. He who commits a wrong, derives an advantage or pleasure by the wrong itself, but occasions

make imaginary laws for imaginary commonwealths, and their discourses are as the stars, which give little light, because they are so high. For the lawyers, they write according to the states where they live; what is received law, and not what ought to be law; for the wisdom of a law-maker is one, and of a lawyer is another. For there are in nature certain fountains of justice, whence all civil laws are derived but as streams; and, like as waters do take tinctures and tastes from the soils through which they run, so do civil laws vary according to the regions and governments where they are planted, though they proceed from the same fountains. Again, the wisdom of a law-maker consisteth not only in a platform of justice, but in the application thereof; taking into consideration by what means laws may be made certain, and what are the causes and remedies of the doubtfulness and uncertainty of law; by what means law may be made apt and easy to be executed, and what are the impediments and remedies in the execution of laws; what influence laws touching private right of *meum* and *tuum* have into the public state, and how they may be made apt and agreeable; how laws are to be penned and delivered, whether in texts or in acts, brief or large, with preambles or without; how they are to be pruned and reformed from time to time, and what is the best means to keep them from being too vast in volumes, or too full of multiplicity and crossness; how they are to be expounded, when upon causes emergent, and judicially discussed; and when upon responses and conferences touching general points or questions; how they are to be pressed, rigorously or tenderly; how they are to be mitigated by equity and good conscience, and whether discretion and strict law are to be mingled in the same courts, or kept apart in several courts. Again, how the practice, pro-

a danger by the example. The rest are not partakers of that advantage or pleasure, but think

fession, and erudition of law is to be censured and governed; and many other points touching the administration, and, as I may term it, animation of laws. Upon which I insist the less, because I propose, if God give me leave, having begun a work of this nature in aphorisms, to propound it hereafter, noting it in the meantime for deficient."

Of the work here referred to, it does not appear that the author had been enabled to execute more than one section or title; being that introduced into his subsequent treatise, *De Augmentis Scientiarum*, and which is here translated. The preamble given to it in that treatise may be thus rendered:

" All who have written about laws, have treated the subject either as philosophers or lawyers. As for the philosophers, they advance many things which sound well, but they are too high for use. The lawyers, again, wedded and tied to the rules of their own municipal law, or, it may be, of the Roman or Canon law, use not an unbiassed judgment, but discourse like men in shackles. It is certain that this knowledge belongs properly to men of civil business and affairs, who can best determine what consists with human society, what with the general safety, what with natural equity, what with the several customs of nations, and what with the different forms of government; and who are thereby able to distinguish in respect of laws, according to the principles and precepts both of natural justice and policy. Let it be our present business, then, to visit the fountains of justice and public utility; and to exhibit, in the several parts of law, a certain impress and notion of right; according to which whosoever is inclined, and studious thereof, may try the laws of particular kingdoms and states, and thus reach the amendment of them. And of this, agreeable to custom, we shall offer an example, in one title."

themselves concerned in the example. They readily agree, therefore, to provide for their safety by laws, lest such wrongs should visit them severally in turn. Yet if it shall happen, by reason of the times, and participation of blame, that a law endangers a greater and more powerful party than it protects, faction makes void the law. And this frequently happens.

3. But private right is under the guardianship of that which is public. For the law protects the citizens, and the magistrates protect the law. Again, the authority of the magistrates depends on the sovereignty, frame of the government, and fundamental laws. If that part, therefore, is healthy and well constituted, the laws will be soundly administered ; but, otherwise, they will scarcely be a safeguard.

4. Yet this is not the sole object of public law, that it should be placed as a guard over private right, to defend it from violation, and for the suppression of wrongs : but it extends moreover to religion, and arms, and discipline, and embellishment, and opulence ; to every thing, in short, which affects the well-being of a state.

5. For the end and scope which the laws ought to contemplate, and to which they should direct their commands and sanctions, is no other but this, that the citizens may live happily ; and

the means are, if they shall be duly trained in piety and religion, virtuous in conduct, securely armed against foreign enemies, fenced by the help of law against insurrections and private injury, obedient to rule and magistracy, well stored and flourishing in abundance and wealth. Now the instruments and sinews of these things are the laws.

6. And by the best laws this end is attained ; but a great number miss the road. For there is a wonderful and extreme difference in laws ; some are excellent, others in a mean, others altogether faulty. We shall, therefore, according to the measure of our discernment, suggest certain laws, as it were, of laws, by which to examine what is well or ill set down or appointed in particular laws.

7. But, before we come to the body itself of the particular laws, we shall touch shortly upon the virtues and dignities of laws in general. Now, that may be counted a good law, which is certain in the intimation, just in the enactment, and convenient in the execution ; which is suitable to the form of the government, and productive of virtue in the subjects.

TITLE I.

Of the first excellence of Laws, that they be certain.

8. OF such importance to a law is its certainty, that without this it cannot even be just: *For, if the trumpet gives an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself for the battle?* In like manner, if the law gives an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself to obey? It needs must warn then, before it strikes. It has been rightly said, too, that that is the best law which allows least to the choice of the judge: now this is obtained by its certainty.

9. There is a twofold uncertainty of law: one, where no law is prescribed; the other, where it is an ambiguous and dark one. We are first, then, to speak of cases omitted by the law; that even

in these may be sought out some rule of certainty.

Of Cases unprovided by the Law.

10. The narrowness of human foresight is unable to comprehend all the cases which time discovers. Cases, therefore, not unfrequently emerge, which are omitted and new. In such cases, a threefold remedy, or supplement, is applied : either by process from analogy ; or by the use of precedents, though they have not been incorporated with the law ; or by tribunals which determine *ex arbitrio boni viri*, and according to a sound discretion, whether such tribunals be Prætorian or Censorian.

Of process by analogy, and extensions of Law.

11. In cases omitted, the rule of law is to be drawn from cases similar ; but cautiously, and with distinction. In regard to which, the following directions are to be observed. Let reason be fruitful ; but practice barren, and not generative of cases. Let not that, therefore, which has been admitted contrary to the reason of the law, or even where the reason is doubtful, be drawn to consequences.

12. An eminent public advantage forcibly draws over to it unprovided cases. When any law, therefore, in a peculiar and superlative manner, contemplates and intends the benefit of the community, let the interpretation of it be liberal and enlarged.

13. It is a cruel thing to torture laws for the purpose of torturing men. We approve not, therefore, the extending of penal, much less of capital laws, to new delicts. Yet, if the matter of the charge should be old, and known to the law, then, although the prosecution of it happens in a new case, not provided for by the law, let the maxim of law be departed from, by all means, rather than crimes go unpunished.

14. In statutes which plainly abrogate the common law, especially regarding things which are of frequent occurrence, and have been long incorporated, it does not seem good to proceed by analogy to the omitted cases. For, since the commonwealth long wanted the law entirely, and that in the cases expressed, there is little detriment though the omitted cases should wait for remedy by a new statute.

15. As for statutes which evidently were laws of the time, and grew out of public necessities which then prevailed, it is enough, where the reason of the time has altered, that they be allowed

to stand in the particular cases ; but to draw them any how to the cases omitted would be preposterous.

16. There is no consequence of a consequence ; but the extension ought to stop within the immediate cases ; otherwise there will be a gradual slide to those which are dissimilar, and edge of wit carry more than weight of law.

17. In laws and statutes of a briefer style, we are to extend more liberally ; but, in such as contain enumeration of particular cases, more cautiously. For, as an exception strengthens the law in the cases not excepted, so an enumeration weakens it in the cases not enumerated.

18. An explanatory statute stops the currents of the prior statute ; nor is an extension afterwards admitted in either. For the judge is not to make a super-extension, where the extension has once begun to be made by the law.

19. Solemnities of words and acts admit not of being extended *ad similia*. For a solemnity loses its nature when it passes from custom to discretion ; and the introduction of what is new detracts from the reverence of the old.

20. It is a natural and ready thing to extend a law to posthumous cases ; which, at the date of the enactment, had not a being in nature. For, where the case could not be expressed because it

existed not at the time, an omitted case is held for expressed, supposing there is a like reason.

And let this suffice regarding the extension of laws in omitted cases. We are to speak next of the use of precedents.

Of Precedents, and their Use.

21. We are now to speak of precedents, from which the rule of right is to be drawn where the law fails. As to custom, which is a kind of law, and those examples which, by frequent use, have grown into custom, as into a tacit law, we shall discourse of them in their proper place. But we talk now of precedents occurring rarely and dispersedly, and which have not consolidated into the strength of law; at what times, namely, and under what limitations, the rule of justice is to be deduced from them, where the law fails.

22. Precedents are to be taken from good and temperate times; not from those which were tyrannical, or factious, or dissolute. Precedents of these latter kinds are spurious births of time, and rather hurt than help.

23. Among precedents, the later are to be accounted the safer. For, of that which was done a little time before, and no inconvenience followed, what should hinder the repetition? Yet, the

recent have less of authority. And where there is need, perhaps, of restoring things to some better state, recent examples savour more of the times than of a right reason.

24. Nevertheless, the more ancient precedents are to be cautiously received, and with discrimination. For the lapse of ages truly alters many things ; so that the same thing which, in respect of time, appears to be old, may, by disturbance, and want of conformity to the present things, be really new. Precedents of the middle time, therefore, are the best ; or rather of that time which sorts, in most respects, with the current ; and this is sometimes better found in a more remote age, than in that which is nearest.

25. Keep within the limits of the precedent ; or rather on this side ; but by no means go beyond. For, when there is not a rule of law, we are to account every thing suspicious ; follow, then, as in the dark, the least distance that you may.

26. We are to beware of fragments and epitomes of precedents ; but the whole case, and its entire process, is to be looked into. For, if it be a rude thing to judge concerning part of a law, without having examined the whole law, much more should this hold in precedents ; which are of doubtful advantage, unless they very much quadrate.

27. It is of the greatest importance in precedents, through what hands they passed and were dispatched. For, if they have obtained only with clerks and servants of justice, in the current of the courts, without manifest cognizance of the superiors ; or, again, with that master of errors the populace, they are to be trampled upon, and disregarded. But, if they have been so placed under the view of senators, and judges, and the principal courts, as that they must of necessity have been strengthened, at least by the tacit approbation of the judges, they possess more of dignity and weight.

28. Precedents which have been noised abroad, though less followed, perhaps, in practice ; since they are known to have been debated and sifted in the discourses and reasonings of men, are, on that account, deserving of more authority ; but those which have lain buried, as it were, in chests and archives, and have notoriously passed into oblivion, are deserving of less ; for precedents are like waters ; the running are the wholesomest.

29. Let not precedents, in matter of law, be taken from books of history, but from public acts, and the more careful reports ; for there is an infelicity common even to the best historians, that they dwell not sufficiently on laws and judicial transactions ; or, if they chance to bestow a de-

gree of diligence upon these, still they are something very different from authority.

30. A precedent which the contemporary, or the last age rejected, in cases then frequently occurring, is not to be readily received ; since the currency which men had given to it for a time does not make so much in its favour, as their dereliction of it, after trial, makes against it.

31. Precedents are called in to give counsel, not to dictate or command. Let them be so ruled, then, as that the authority of the past time may bend to the uses of the present.

And so much for information by precedent, where the law fails. We are now to speak of prætorian and censorian courts.

Of Prætorian and Censorian Courts.

32. Let there be courts and jurisdictions to decide, *ex arbitrio boni viri*, and by a sound discretion, where the canon of the law fails. For law, as already said, does not keep pace with occasions, being shaped for ordinary occurrences ; but time, (as the ancients have well observed,) is an exceedingly shrewd thing, and the daily author and discoverer of new cases.

33. But new cases intervene, both in criminal matters, which call for punishment ; and in civil,

which call for help. Courts having respect to the former, we term censorian ; to the latter, prætorian.

34. Let the censorian courts have a jurisdiction and power, not only of punishing new delicts, but also of increasing the punishment which the laws have appointed for old delicts, if the cases should be hateful and enormous ; provided they be not capital ; for what is enormous is in a manner new.

35. Let prætorian courts, in like manner, have power as well to give relief from the rigour of the law as to supply the defect of the law ; for, if aid should be extended to him whom the law has neglected, much more to him whom it has wounded.

36. Let these censorian and prætorian courts confine themselves wholly to cases anomalous and extraordinary ; nor make a breach on the customary jurisdictions ; lest, peradventure, the matter tend rather to supplanting than supplying the law.

37. Let these jurisdictions reside in supreme courts only, and not be communicated to the inferior ; for the power of supplying, or extending, or limiting the laws, is not very distant from the power of making them.

38. Let these courts, however, not be entrusted to one man, but be composed of several. Neither

let their decrees go forth silently ; but the judges render the reasons of their opinion, and that publicly, and in a circle of bystanders ; so that what is truly unfettered in the power may yet, by notoriety and opinion, be circumscribed.

39. Let there be no rubrics of blood ; neither let judgment follow in capital cases, except by a known and certain law. God himself denounced death first, and then inflicted. Nor is life to be taken, but from him who knew beforehand that he was sinning against his life.

40. In censorian courts, let a third die be allowed ; so that judges be not laid under the necessity of either acquitting or condemning, but have power, also, to pronounce by a *non liquet*. Again, let there not only be a censorian pain, but likewise a censorian mark ; that is to say, not inflicting punishment, but either stopping in admonition, or correcting with a slight note of ignominy, and, as it were, a tinct of shame.

41. In censorian courts, let the inchoate and intermediate acts of all great crimes and villanies be punished, although the complete effect do not follow. And let this even be the chief function of these courts ; since it both conduces to severity, that the beginnings of crimes should receive punishment ; and to mercy, that the perpetration of

them should, by visiting the unfinished acts, be prevented.

42. It is a leading caution, that relief be not given by prætorian courts, in those cases which the law did not so much forget, as despise for their insignificance ; or, as odious, considered unworthy of redress.

43. Most of all, it concerns the certainty of laws, (which is our present business,) that prætorian courts do not swell and overflow to such a degree, as, under pretence of mitigating the rigour of the laws, even to cut or relax the strength and sinews of them, drawing all things to an arbitrary discretion.

44. Let not prætorian courts have the right of judging, under any pretence of equity, against express statute ; for, if this should happen, the judge would immediately be transformed into the lawgiver, and all things hang upon his will.

45. By some it is held that the jurisdiction which decides according to equity, and that other which proceeds according to strict law, should be committed to the same courts ; by others, again, that they are to be vested separately. We approve, on every account, the separation of the courts. For, where there is a mixture of jurisdictions, the distinction of cases will not be pre-

served ; but equity will, in the end, supersede law.

46. The *Prætor's album*, which came into use among the Romans, was a thing not without reason ; where he set forth, and published, in what manner he would interpret the law. And, after this pattern, ought judges in the courts of equity, as far as possible, to propose and establish rules for themselves, and publicly affix them. For it is the best law which allows least discretion to the judge, and the best judge who allows least to himself.

But of these courts we are to discourse more at large, when we come to the subject of Decrees. We have spoken of them now only by the way ; and in so far as they further and supply what are omissions of the law.

Of the Retrospection of Laws.

47. There is also another way of supplying cases omitted ; namely, when law supervenes upon law, and carries the omitted cases with it. And this happens in laws or statutes having a retrospect, to use the common language. Yet laws of this kind are to be employed seldom, and with great caution ; for we like not a Janus in the law.

48. He that by quirk and fraud eludes, and circumvents, the letter or the meaning of a law, well deserves to be noosed by a succeeding law. In cases, therefore, of deceit and fraudulent evasion, it is just that laws look behind, and one support another ; so that he who cunningly devises to subvert the present laws, may at least have to fear the future.

49. Laws which strengthen and confirm the true purpose of acts and instruments, against the defects of *formulae*, or solemnities, most fitly embrace the past. For it is, in reality, the chief fault of a retrospective law, that it disturbs ; but these sort of corroborative laws contemplate the quiet and maintenance of what has been transacted. Yet care is to be taken that matters adjudged be not torn up, or unsettled.

50. Much heed is necessary lest those only be counted retrospective laws which invalidate things already done ; and not such also as forbid and restrain things future, when connected necessarily with the past. Thus, if a law should interdict particular artizans from vending their wares in time coming, it sounds prospectively, but it acts retrospectively ; for they are no longer free to seek their living otherwise.

51. Every declaratory law, though it may not speak of the past, is yet altogether drawn back

to the past, by the very force of the declaration. For the interpretation does not begin at the time when it is declared ; but is made, as it were, contemporary with the law itself. Do not, therefore, pass declaratory laws, except in cases where it is consistent with justice that the laws should have a retrospect.

And here we dismiss the part which treats of the uncertainty of laws, where no law is found. We are now to speak of the other part ; namely, where there is a law extant, but one that is perplexed and dark.

Of the Obscurity of Laws.

52. The obscurity of laws has a fourfold origin ; proceeding either from too great accumulation of laws, especially when there is a mixture of such as are obsolete ; or from their ambiguous, or indistinct and unclear character ; or from negligent and ill-instituted methods of expounding the law ; or, lastly, from contradiction and instability of judgments.

Of the too great Multiplication of Laws.

53. The Prophet says, “ He shall rain snares upon them.” But there are no worse snares than

snares of law ; particularly of penal laws ; when, swelled to immense number, and, through course of time, grown useless, they do not hold a lamp to the feet, but rather spread a net.

54. Two methods have come to be observed in the enactment of new statutes. One is, to confirm and renew the former statutes regarding the same subject ; thereafter adding or changing some particulars. The other is, to abrogate and rescind all that was previously established ; and to substitute an entirely new and uniform law. And we approve of the latter plan : for, in the way first mentioned, enactments become intricate and perplexed ; and, though the immediate purpose indeed is served, yet the body of the laws is thereby injured ; whereas, by the other, it is true that more care must be employed in concocting the particular law ; and former enactments need to be well considered, and oft weighed, before the new is passed ; but hereby is effected the best agreement of laws in future.

55. It was a custom with the Athenians, that the contradictory parts of their laws, (which they called *antinomiae*,) were to be examined yearly by *sexviri* ; and such as could not be reconciled were to be proposed to the people, that something certain might be statuted upon them. And, after their example, let such as possess the legislative

power in any government, every third or fourth year, or at such periods as appear eligible, revise the contradictory laws. Yet let these be first examined and prepared by persons chosen for the purpose, and then submitted to the assemblies ; that what is approved may be established and fixed by suffrage.

56. But allow not an over sedulous or earnest endeavour to reconcile opposing chapters of the law, and to save all, as it is termed, by subtle and forced distinctions. For this is a web of wit, and, whatever show it may carry of a certain modesty and veneration, is nevertheless to be accounted prejudicial; for it is this which makes the general body of the laws to be diverse and ill-pieced. It is preferable, on all accounts, that the worse go, and the better stand alone.

57. Let the laws which are obsolete, and have gone into disuse, no less than the *antinomiae*, be presented by the appointed committees, for abrogation. For, as an express statute is not properly abrogated by disuse, it follows that, through contempt of the obsolete laws, even the rest lose something of their authority ; and that torment of Mezentius ensues, that the living laws perish in the arms of the dead. We are to guard, then, by all means, against a gangrene in the laws.

58. Moreover, in laws and statutes which have become obsolete, and have not been promulgated

anew, let prætorian courts have the power, meantime, of deciding contrary to them. For, though it is well enough said, that no one should be wiser than the law, this is to be understood of the laws when they are awake, not when they sleep. But, let the power of giving relief against the more recent statutes, (which are found prejudicial to public justice) be vested, not at all in the prætor, but in the king, and the more solemn councils, and the supreme authority ; suspending, by acts or edicts, the execution of them, till the period return for the general estates, or other like assemblies, which have power to abrogate them ; lest the safety of the people be in the meantime endangered.

Of new Digests of the Laws.

59. But if, by accumulation one upon another, the laws have grown to such enormous bulk, or labour under so great confusion, that it may be profitable to revise them *de integrō*, and bring them back to a sound and habile body, let this above all be carried into execution ; and a work of the kind be *opus heroicum*, and the authors of such work be, in due form, and deservedly, numbered among the founders and institutors of laws.

60. This sort of expurgation, and new digest of laws, is perfected in five points. First, let the

obsolete be left out, which Justinian calls *antiquæ fabulæ*. Next, out of the contradictory laws, let the most approved be taken, and those which are opposite annulled. Thirdly, let the *homonymiæ*, or laws which are identical in meaning, and nothing else but iterations of the same thing, be expunged ; and some one among them, which is the most perfect, be retained in room of the whole. Fourthly, if any of the laws determine nothing, but merely start questions, and leave them undecided, let such in like manner pack. Lastly, those which are found to be wordy and over prolix, are to be contracted and abridged.

61. Farther, in the new digest of the laws, it will be of great use that those received for common law, and of which the origin is in a manner past memory, and again, those others which have been statuted and superadded from time to time, should be digested and arranged separately ; because, in distributing justice, the interpretation and application of common and statute law, are in many cases different. Which Trebonian observed in the Digest and Code.

62. In this kind of regeneration of laws, however, and new compilation of the old laws and books, let the words and text of the law be retained throughout ; even though it should be necessary to excerpt them by centos and small portions ; and

let these be afterwards compacted in order. For though it might be more seemly perhaps, and, looking to right reason, even better, that the thing should be done by a new text, than by this method of patching, yet in laws we are not so much to regard style and writing, as authority, and the supporter of it, antiquity. Such a work might otherwise appear to be something scholastic and theoretical, rather than a body of imperative and authentic laws.

63. It would be advisable, in new digests of the law, that the old volumes should not be altogether cancelled, and pass into oblivion; but remain at least in the libraries; though the general and promiscuous use of them be discharged. For, in the weightier cases, it would not be unfit to consult and look into the changes and successions of the past laws; and it certainly adds veneration, when things modern can have a sprinkling of antiquity. But, be this as it may, such new body of the laws is to be ratified by those having the legislative power in the several governments; lest, haply, under pretence of digesting the old laws, new ones be covertly imposed.

64. It were to be wished that this kind of instauration of the laws should be undertaken in those times, which, in learning and knowledge of affairs, surpass the more ancient, whose acts and

works they revise. And yet it was otherwise in the labours of Justinian. For it is an unhappy thing, when the work of antiquity is taken down and remodelled, according to the judgment and discretion of an age that is inferior in wisdom and knowledge. But that is often necessary which is not best.

And hitherto of the obscurity of laws from their excessive and confused number. We are now to speak of the doubtful and obscure wording of them.

Of the perplexed and obscure wording of Laws.

65. The obscure penning of laws happens, either from their loquacity and verboseness, or from their excessive brevity, or from the preface being at variance with the body of the law.

66 *. We are to speak, then, at present, of the obscurity of laws, arising from the ill penning of them. The verboseness and prolixity, which have become usual in the writing out of laws, is to be avoided. And, in truth, it does not by any means reach what it desires and aims at ; but rather the

* The first sentence of this 66th aphorism, is either an accidental repetition, or ought to stand as the beginning of the 65th.

contrary. For while it strives to follow out and express the particular cases separately, in apt and explicit terms, hoping thereby for a greater certainty, it does, on the other hand, beget manifold questions out of the terms ; so that the interpretation according to the sense of the law, (which is the sounder and truer) finds its way with more difficulty, through the bustle of the words.

67. Yet neither, on that account, is an over concise and affected shortness, for the sake of majesty, and a greater show of command, a thing to be esteemed ; especially in this age ; lest the law should appear to take after the Lesbian rule *. A mean, therefore, is to be sought out, and a well defined generality of words to be studied ; which, though it do not anxiously follow out the cases comprehended, yet excludes, with sufficient clearness, those not comprehended.

68. In laws and proclamations, however, of an ordinary and political kind, where, for the most part, no one takes advice of lawyers, but trusts to his own interpretation, every thing ought to be unfolded more at large, and pointed out, as it were by the finger, to the vulgar apprehension.

* According to Aristotle, the Lesbian builders made use of a *leaden rule*, which they bent and accommodated to the shape of the stones.

69. Neither would prefaces of laws, which of old were counted impertinent, and introduce the laws haranguing in place of commanding, be at all acceptable to us, if ancient manners might be endured. But, as the times now are, such prologues of laws must, in the greater number of cases, be employed ; not so much for explication of the law, as by way of persuasive, in order to carry it through the general estates ; and again, for satisfaction of the people. Let such prefaces, however, be avoided as far as possible, and the law begin with the injunction.

70. Though it may sometimes happen, that the intention and meaning of a law are not ill gathered out of prefaces, and preambles, (as they are called,) yet we are by no means to derive from these its latitude or extension. For the preamble often catches at something of what is most plausible and specious, for an example, while yet the law embraces many more things ; or, on the other hand, the law makes many restrictions and limitations, the reason of which limitations needed not to be inserted in the preamble. The dimension and breadth of the law, therefore, are to be sought in the body of the law ; for the preamble often either overshoots or falls short of it.

71. But there is one way of penning laws which is exceeding faulty ; namely, when the case

at which the law levels is expressed at large in the preamble, and then by the force of the word *such*, or some other relative, the body of the law is turned back upon the preamble; whereby the preamble is engrafted and embodied into the law itself: which is both obscure, and somewhat unsafe; because it is not customary to bestow the same care in weighing and examining the words of a preamble, that is employed on the body of the law itself.

This part, concerning the uncertainty of laws as it arises from the faulty wording of them, will be treated more copiously, when we come to consider the interpretation of laws. What has been said, therefore, may suffice as to the obscure expression of laws; we are next to speak concerning the ways of expounding the law.

Of the ways of Expounding the Law, and removing its Ambiguities.

72. The ways of expounding law, and clearing what is doubtful, are five. For it is done either by recording of decisions, or by authoritative writers, or by auxiliary books, or by prelections, or by the responses and opinions of learned counsel. All these, if rightly ordered, will be ready and great helps against the obscurity of laws.

Of the Reporting of Decisions.

73. Above all, let the judgments given in the supreme and principal courts, and in the cases of weight, especially such as are doubtful, and have something in them difficult or new, be taken down with fidelity and care. For decisions are the anchors of the laws, as the laws are of the commonwealth.

74. Let the way of marking such decisions, and the reducing them into writing, be as follows. The cases are to be written out concisely; the judgments themselves exactly; add the reasons of deciding, given by the judges; mix not with the principal cases the authority of cases used for illustration; of the declamations of advocates, unless they happen to have something in them very transcendent, say nothing.

75. Let the persons who note such decisions be taken from the most learned of the advocates, and have a liberal recompense from the public*. Let the judges themselves abstain from writings of this kind; lest, haply, devoted to their own opinions, and relying on their own authority, they should overstep the province of reporters.

* Lord Bacon, when Chancellor, obtained from King James VI. the appointment of two Reporters, with salaries of £100 each.

76. Let these decisions be arranged in the order and series of time, not by method and heads. For such writings are like histories or annals of law. And not only the things themselves that are done, but also the times of doing, give light to an intelligent judge.

Of Authoritative Writers.

77. Let the body of the law consist only of those laws themselves which constitute the common law ; next of the ordinances or statutes ; and thirdly of the recorded judgments. Besides these, let not any thing be received as authority, or sparingly.

78. Nothing so much tends to the certainty of the laws, (which is the present matter,) as to confine the authoritative writings within moderate compass ; and to get rid of the excessive crowd of authors and doctors in the law, whereby the sense of the laws is mangled, judges become distracted, suits immortal, and the advocate himself, unable to read through and master such volumes, is driven to abridgments. Some good gloss, perhaps, and a few of the classical writers, or rather some few portions out of a few writers, may be received as authority. Of the rest, some use, indeed, may continue in the libraries, so that

judges or advocates may look into their treatises, when occasion requires ; but, in the pleading of causes, let them not be cited to the court, or suffered to pass into authorities.

Of Auxiliary Books.

79. Yet the learning and practice of the law is not to be stripped of auxiliary books, but rather supplied with them. Of these, let there be six sorts ; institutions, glossaries, maxims of law, antiquities of law, abridgments, and forms of procedure.

80. By Institutions, the youth and students are to be prepared for drawing, and imbibing more deeply, and with greater advantage, the learning and intricacies of law. Let such institutes be composed on a clear and perspicuous plan. Run over in them, likewise, the subject of private right ; not forgetting some parts, and dwelling on others more than is fit, but giving a short taste or essay of each ; so that he who comes afterwards to the perusal of the body of the law, may encounter nothing which is altogether strange to him, or not by some slight acquaintance anticipated. Touch not, in the institutions, upon public law ; but let that be drawn from the head springs.

81. Let a Glossary of law terms be prepared.

In the unfolding and rendering the sense of these, deal not over curiously, or with too great pains ; for the business is not to find exact definitions of the words, but such explanations as may open the way more easily in reading the books of law. Neither is such a treatise to be digested alphabetically ; leave this for some index ; but let those terms be placed together which concern the same matter, so that one may be a help to the understanding of another.

82. If any thing more than another conduces to the certainty of the laws, it is a good and careful treatise concerning the various Rules or Maxims of law. It is worthy of being committed to the greatest talents, and the most able lawyers. Nor do we approve of what is extant in this kind ; for there is to be a collection made, not only of the common and noted rules, but of others, also, more subtle and profound, which may be drawn from the harmony of laws and adjudged cases ; such as are met with at times in the best rubrics ; being general dictates of reason, which run through the different subjects of law, and are in a manner the ballast of justice *.

* The author's unfinished work, on the Maxims of the English Law, corresponds to that here described ; except in so far as modified by the peculiar institutions, and system of laws, in that country.

83. But the several statutes and ordinances of law are not to be taken for rules ; as they often are, unskilfully enough ; for, if this were received, then so many laws, so many rules ; since a law is nothing else but a rule imperative. But those are to be taken for rules, which cleave to the very form of justice *; whence it happens, for the most part, that, in the civil laws of different countries, nearly the same rules are found ; unless they chance to vary, by relation to the forms of the governments.

84. After the rule, enunciated in a short and substantial compass of words, let examples be added, and some of the adjudged cases, which are clearest, for illustration ; distinctions and exceptions, for limitation ; and things akin, for amplification of the particular rule.

85. It is rightly enjoined, that the law shall not be taken from the rules, but the rule be made from that which is law. Neither, certainly, are the words of the rule to be the standard, as if it were a text of the law ; for the rule does not ordain the law, but indicates it, (as the mariner's needle does the poles.)

* It is evident that by the form of justice is here to be understood the *essential* form, or that in which its true and distinctive nature consists.

86. Besides the body itself of the law, it will be of use to survey the Antiquities of the law ; for, granting their authority to be gone, yet the reverence continues. By antiquities of law, I would understand what has been written about laws and judgments, whether published or not, which preceded in time the body of the laws itself. If possible, these are not to be lost. Single out, therefore, whatever they have most useful, (for you will find much that is empty and frivolous,) and reduce them into a separate volume ; that the old fables, (as Trebonian calls them,) may not be mixed with the laws themselves.

87. Farther, it is highly important for use, that the whole law be orderly digested into heads and titles, where immediate recourse may be had, (on the occasion,) as to a storehouse furnished for present need. Such summaries at once arrange that which is scattered, and abbreviate that which is diffuse and prolix in the law. Care is to be taken, however, that these Abridgments do not render men expert for practice, but truants to the real learning ; for their proper office is to refresh, not to perfect, our knowledge of the law. It is necessary, therefore, on every account, that such compendiums be made with great diligence, fidelity, and judgment ; so as not to commit a stealth upon the law.

88. Collect the different Forms of Action, in every class. For it is of use in practice ; and these certainly disclose the oracles and secrets of the laws. For there are not a few things, which, in the laws, are hidden ; but in the forms of action, are seen better, and more at large ; like the fist and the palm.

Of Responses and Opinions.

89. It is fit that some order should be taken for ending and resolving the particular doubts, which emerge from time to time. For it is hard, that those who would guard against mistake should not find a guide for the way ; but should be enforced to run the hazard ; and the law be no-wise discoverable before execution of the matter.

90. But that such *Responsa Prudentum*, as are given to suitors touching points of right, whether by advocates or doctors, should have so great strength of authority, as that no recourse be allowed from their opinion to the judge, is not fitting. Let justice be administered by the sworn judges.

91. We do not approve the essaying of judgments by feigned cases, and parties : so that men should thereby make experiment how the law would square. For it throws a contempt on the

majesty of law, and is to be accounted a sort of untruth. And, for courts in their judgments to borrow any thing of the stage, is unseemly.

92. Let the answers and opinions, then, as well as the decrees, be the province only of the judges; the latter concerning suits depending, the other concerning difficult questions of law *in thesi*. Yet, whether in private matters or public, ask not such opinions from the judges themselves; (for then the judge would pass into the advocate,) but from the sovereign or state; and let them give commission to the judges. Let the judges, again, supported by this authority, hear the debate of lawyers, whether employed by those having interest, or, if necessary, assigned by the courts themselves; and the arguments on either side; and, after deliberation on the matter, let them dispatch and declare the law. Let such opinions be reported, and published among the decisions, and have the like authority.

Of Prelections.

93. Prelections on law, and the exercises of those dedicating their studies and labour to the law, should be so ordered and appointed, as that all may tend rather to settle doubts and contro-

versies concerning points of right, than to stir them. For, (as things now are,) a school appears to be every where set up and opened, for wrangling, and the multiplying of questions in law, as it were for display of wit. And this is an old grievance. For so, with the ancients too, it was matter of glory, as if by sects and parties, to foster manifold debates about the law, rather than extinguish them. Let this be provided against.

Of the Instability of Judgments.

94. Judgments fluctuate, either because of unripe and overhasty decision ; or because of rivalry in courts ; or because of the bad and unskilful penning of judgments ; or because of too easy and expeditious ways being afforded for the reversal of them. Accordingly, care is to be taken that decrees go forth only after a mature deliberation ; and that courts mutually respect each other ; and that judgments be written out with trust and knowledge ; and the road to reversal of them be narrow and rugged, and, as it were, set with thorns.

95. If judgment shall have been given upon any case in one of the principal courts, and the like case arises in another court, proceed not to decision, till first there be a consultation in some

greater assemblage of judges. For, if judgments given must needs be sometimes rescinded, let them at least have honourable interment.

96. That courts should fight and grapple for jurisdiction, is incident to human weakness ; and the more so, because through a certain foolish adage, (that it is the part of a good and zealous judge to enlarge the jurisdiction of his court,) this intemperance is directly cherished, and the spur applied where the curb is wanted. But that courts, from this vehemence of spirit, should reverse without scruple the judgments which they have respectively pronounced, no way concerning jurisdiction, is an intolerable evil, and to be forthwith redressed by the king, or the senate, or the government. For it is a thing of most pernicious example, that courts, which administer peace to the subjects, should be engaged in a warfare among themselves.

97. Let not a smooth and patent road be left to the reversing of judgments, by appeal, petition of error, review, or the like. By some it is held, that the question should go to the higher tribunal, as a matter entire ; the sentence given upon it being superseded, and altogether suspended ; by others, again, that the decree itself should continue in force, and only the execution of it stop. We like neither way, unless the court in

which judgment was given should be mean, and of inferior rank ; but, rather, that both the judgment remain, and the execution of it proceed ; provided that security is given by the defendant, for damages and costs, if the judgment should be reversed.

And let this title, respecting the certainty of laws, serve for an example of that remaining digest which we contemplate.

*EXEMPLUM PORTIONIS DOCTRINÆ DE
OCCASIONIBUS SPARSIS, EX PARABOLIS
ALIQUIBUS SOLOMONIS.*

De Aug. Scient. lib. viii. cap. 2.

EXAMPLE OF A DIRECTORY FOR DIFFERENT
OCCASIONS, FROM SOME OF THE PROVERBS
OF SOLOMON.

EXAMPLE OF A DIRECTORY FOR DIFFERENT OCCASIONS, FROM SOME OF THE PROVERBS OF SOLOMON *.

PROV. 1. "*A soft answer turneth away wrath* †."

EXPLANATION. IF the anger of a prince or superior is kindled against you, and it is now your part to speak, Solomon advises two things; one, that an answer should be made; the other, that it should be a soft one. The former contains three

* The author's introductory observations on this part of the subject, in the 8th book "De Augmentis Scientiarum," do not vary much from the corresponding passage in the 2d book

† Proverbs xv. 1.

directions. First, That you beware of a sad and stubborn silence ; for that either takes the whole blame upon yourself, as if you had nothing to reply ; or insinuates a charge of injustice

of his “ *Advancement of Learning* ;” which last is in the following words :

“ The wisdom touching negotiation or business hath not been hitherto collected into writing, to the great derogation of learning and the professors of learning. For, from this root springeth chiefly that note or opinion, which by us is expressed in adage to this effect, that there is no great concurrence between learning and wisdom. For of the three wisdoms which we have set down to pertain to civil life,” [wisdom of behaviour, wisdom of business, and wisdom of state,] “ for wisdom of behaviour, it is by learned men, for the most part, despised, as an inferior to virtue, and an enemy to meditation ; for wisdom of government, they acquit themselves well when they are called to it, but that happeneth to few ; but for the wisdom of business, wherein man’s life is most conversant, there be no books of it, except some few scattered advertisements, that have no proportion to the magnitude of this subject. For if books were written of this, as the other, I doubt not but learned men, with mean experience, would far excel men of long experience, without learning, and outshoot them in their own bow.

“ Neither needeth it at all to be doubted, that this knowledge should be so variable as it falleth not under precept ; for it is much less infinite than science of government, which we see is laboured, and in some part reduced. Of this wisdom it seemeth some of the ancient Romans, in the saddest and wisest times, were professors ; for Cicero reporteth that it was then in use for senators that had name and opinion for general wise men, as Coruncanius, Curius, Lælius, and many others, to

against your master, as if his ears were not open even to a just excuse. Secondly, That you beware of adjourning the matter, or of asking another time for your justification ; because this either fixes the same stigma with the former, namely, that your master is transported by unreasonable heat ; or it plainly denotes that you meditate some laboured defence, having nothing

walk at certain hours in the *place*, and to give audience to those that would use their advice ; and that the particular citizens would resort unto them, and consult with them of the marriage of a daughter, or of the employing of a son, or of a purchase, or bargain, or of an accusation, and many other occasions incident to man's life ; so as there is a wisdom of counsel and advice even in private cases, arising out of an universal insight into the affairs of the world ; which is now indeed upon particular cases propounded, but is gathered by general observation of cases of like nature. For so we see in the book which Q. Cicero writes to his brother, *De Petitione Consulatus*, (being the only book of business that I know written by the ancients) although it concerned a particular action then on foot, yet the substance thereof consisteth of many wise and politic axioms, which contain not a temporary but a perpetual direction in the case of popular elections ; but chiefly we may see in those aphorisms which have place amongst divine writings, composed by Solomon the king, of whom the Scriptures testify that his heart was as the sands of the sea, encompassing the world, and all worldly matters ; we see, I say, not a few profound and excellent cautions, precepts, and positions, extending to much variety of occasions ; whereupon we will stay a while, offering to consideration some number of examples."

in immediate readiness. So that it were best always to take something at hand, and growing out of the occasion, for the matter of your excuse. Thirdly, That it be really an answer which you make ; an answer, I say ; not a mere confession, or mere submission, but something having colour of apology or extenuation ; for it is unsafe to proceed otherwise, except with dispositions highly generous and noble ; such as are very seldom to be found. In the last place, it follows that the answer be a soft one ; not any way sharp or grating.

2. "*A wise servant shall have rule over a son that causeth shame, and shall have part of the inheritance among the brethren *.*"

IN all troubled and discordant families, there rises up ever some servant or humble friend, of great influence, who proceeds at his own pleasure in the ordering of the family differences ; and to whom, in this character, both the entire household, and the master himself, are under a subjection. This person, if he looks only to his own interest, foments and aggravates the family disor-

* Prov. xvii. 2.

ders ; but, if he be truly faithful and upright, he is indeed most valuable ; so as even to deserve being counted for a brother, or at least having an administration, in trust, of their inheritance.

3. "*If a wise man contendeth with a foolish man, whether he rage or laugh, there is no rest*.*"

We are oftener admonished to avoid unequal encounters, in the sense of not contending with a stronger. Yet of no less importance is the advice here given by Solomon, that we contend not with the worthless : for, in such a case, there is a disadvantage every way ; since, if we prove superior, it is no victory which follows ; if we be overcome, it is a great disgrace. Neither does it avail, when engaged in a strife of this kind, though we sometimes give the matter a turn to pleasantry, at other times to disdain and contempt. For, whatever course we try, we shall be losers ; and we cannot quit ourselves to advantage. But the case is worst of all, if the person with whom, (in Solomon's language) we contend, has something akin to the fool ; namely, a sort of hardihood and rashness.

* Prov. xxix. 9.

4. “*Also take no heed unto all words that are spoken, lest thou hear thy servant curse thee +.*”

It is scarcely credible how far life may be disturbed by a fruitless curiosity about matters which concern us ; that is, if we pry busily into secrets, which, being detected and found, are a sure grief to the mind, but of no advantage in furthering our business. For, in the first place, follows vexation and disquiet of mind ; since every thing human is full of perfidy and ingratitude. So that, if some magical glass could be procured, wherein we might behold the enmities, and all other motions that are any where directed against us, we should do well straightway to dash it in pieces. For things of this kind are like the muttering of leaves, and quickly die away. Secondly, such curiosity overloads the mind with suspicion ; which is most adverse to counsels, and renders them unstable and perplexed. Thirdly, it most commonly fixes the very evils which would otherwise go past. For it is a serious matter to irritate the consciences of men ; who, if they expect to continue undiscovered, more easily amend ; but,

when they find themselves caught, repel harm by harm. And therefore it was justly counted a high pitch of wisdom in Pompey the Great, that he immediately burned all Sertorius's papers ; without either himself reading them, or allowing others to do so.

5. “ *Poverty comes as one that travelleth, and want as an armed man**.”

The proverb beautifully describes, how those that are prodigal and negligent in their affairs are overtaken with shipwreck of their fortunes. For debt, and impair of inheritance, come at first like a traveller, step by step, slowly on, and almost unperceived ; but not long after follows want, and assails like an armed man ; that is to say, with a hand so forcible and violent as can no longer be resisted. For it is well expressed among the ancients, that, of all things, want is the strongest. We are to meet the traveller, then, and to fence ourselves against the armed man.

* Prov. vi. 11.—xxiv. 32.

6. “ *He that reproveth a scorner getteth to himself shame, and he that rebuketh a wicked man getteth to himself a blot* *.”

It agrees with the precept of our Saviour, *not to throw pearls before swine*. In the present parable, however, a distinction is made between the offices of instruction and rebuke. Again, a distinction is made between the characters of the scorner and the wicked. Lastly, there is a distinction of the return got. For, in the former, the repayment is scorn ; in the latter, there is also a stain : Since, if one teaches, or argues with, a scorner, first, there is waste of time ; then, others, too, make game of the endeavour, as a vain thing, and a labour ill-bestowed ; lastly, the scorner himself holds in derision the lesson which is given to him. But, in the rebuke of the ungodly, there is yet more danger ; because not only does the wicked refuse to listen, but he presents his horns, and, irritated against the reprobate, perhaps tears him with immediate abuse, or at least crimинates him afterwards to others.

* Prov. ix. 7.

7. “ *A wise son maketh a glad father; but a foolish son is the heaviness of his mother **.”

A distinction is made in family consolations and griefs ; namely, between those of the father and the mother, in respect of their children. For a wise and frugal son is the comfort chiefly of his father ; who, better than the mother, knows the value of virtue ; and, on that account, the son’s disposition inclining to virtue is more the occasion of gladness to him. Perhaps, too, he has a pride in his own discipline ; that he trained his son so well, and stamped upon him, by instruction and example, this probity of character. A mother, on the contrary, has more of compassion and sorrow in her son’s calamity ; both because of maternal love more soft and tender ; and, it may be, calling to mind her own indulgence, whereby she had spoiled and corrupted him.

8. “ *The memory of the just is blessed; but the name of the wicked shall rot †.*”

A distinction is made between the estimation of good and bad men, such as it uses to be after

* Prov. x. 1.

† Prov. x. 7.

death. For the malice which, during their lives, plucked at the reputation of the good, being now extinct, their name presently puts forth its blossoms, and every day adds increase to their praise. Whereas, though the reputation of bad men may, by the countenance of friends, and those of the same party, endure for a short season, yet in a little after springs a loathing of their name ; till at last their praise fades away, and ends in infamy, and as it were in a dull and fetid odour.

9. "*He that troubleth his own house shall inherit the wind* *."

An admonition of great use, regarding domestic broils and discords. For many promise great things to themselves, from separations of wives, disinheritance of children, and frequent family changes; expecting thereby either the quieting of their minds, or a happier direction of their affairs. But these hopes end commonly in wind. Since, not only are such changes for the most part no improvement ; but it usually happens that these disturbers of their homes meet with sundry vexations, and the ingratitude of those

* Prov. xi. 29.

whom they adopt, and make choice of, in preference to others. Besides, they breed in this way rumours not very favourable, and draw suspicion on themselves ; for it is not ill noted by Cicero, that all character begins with domestics. Now, each of these evils is elegantly expressed by Solomon, as an inheriting of the wind ; since the wind is a fit comparison, both for the disappointment of expectation, and the waking of surmise.

10. “*Better is the end of a thing, than the beginning thereof**.”

The proverb taxes a mistake very frequent, not only with those whose chief care is bestowed upon words, but even with the wiser sort ; namely, that men are more solicitous about the introduction and entrance of their discourses, than about the issue ; and study every minute preface and exordium of their speeches, more exactly than the concluding parts. But it were fit both to remember the former, and also to have

* Eccles. Ch. vii. verse 8. The passage is thus rendered in the Latin Vulgate, of 1481. *Melior est finis orationis quam principium.* To which version the explanation here given is more especially applicable.

the latter, (as of much more importance) prepared and digested by them ; inwardly revolving, and as far as possible foreseeing in mind, what the issue and winding up of their discourse is to be, and how the business may be forwarded and matured by it. Nor is this all. For it is not only necessary to study the conclusions and passages of that discourse, which has a regard to the particular matter itself ; but care must likewise be employed on such sayings as may be aptly and cleverly thrown in, just at the close, though entirely foreign to the business. I have myself known two councillors, great and wise men certainly, and on whom the weight of affairs then principally lay, whose constant and peculiar manner it was, whenever they conferred with their sovereigns on business, never to end their conversations with what regarded the business itself ; but always to contrive an agreeable turn, either to some jest, or other matter which it was pleasant to hear ; and thus, according to the saying, *to wash down their sea phrases with a little river water.*

11. “*Dead flies cause the ointment of the apothecary to send forth a stinking savour; so doth a little folly him that is in reputation for wisdom and honour**.”

Hard, indeed, and unhappy, is the condition of men who surpass in virtue; as the proverb excellently notes; whose errors, let them be ever so slight, meet with no manner of indulgence. For, as it happens in a gem of great lustre, that any the smallest grain or little cloud strikes and somewhat offends the eye, while the same, if it were found in a more worthless stone, would scarcely be remarked; so, in men endowed with singular virtue, every the most inconsiderable fault is immediately exposed to the eyes and talk of men, and is handled with severe censure; although in ordinary men it would either escape notice altogether, or would be readily excused. Thus, a man of uncommon wisdom suffers much loss of reputation by a slight folly; an eminently virtuous man by a slight transgression; a man of polished and correct carriage by a trifling impropriety; so that it were not altogether to be condemned, if men of transcendent characters

* Eccles. x. 1.

should mix in their conduct some things not according to rule, provided they are admissible without vice ; that they may preserve their liberty, as it were, and drown the distinction of their lesser frailties.

12. "*Scornful men bring a city into a snare, but wise men turn away wrath**."

It may be thought strange, that Solomon, when describing those men who have been provided, as it were, and formed by nature, for the ruin and overthrow of states, should have selected, not the character of the proud and overbearing man ; not of the tyrannical and cruel ; not of the rash and violent ; not of the ungodly and flagitious ; not of the unjust man and the oppressor ; not of the seditious and turbulent ; not of the sensual and voluptuous ; finally, not of the weak and incapable ; but of the scorner. And yet it is entirely befitting the wisdom of that king, who best knew the stays and the subversions of empires ; since there is hardly so great a pest to kingdoms and nations, as when the king's counsellors, or the senators, and those advanced to the helm of affairs, are by nature scorners. For

* Prov. xxix. 8.

men of this stamp ever palliate the magnitude of dangers, that they may appear vigorous in their measures, and insult over other men as timid, who rate the dangers at their real worth; they sneer at the mature pauses of counsel and deliberation, and consider debate as an oratorical affair, and full of weariness, and no way profitable for the dispatch of business; public opinion, on which the counsels of rulers should be principally formed, they despise, accounting it as so much vulgar breath, and a thing of no duration; the power and authority of law they disregard, as a kind of net by which things of magnitude are by no means to be confined; admonitions and warnings of long reach they reject, as a kind of dreams and melancholy apprehensions; men of solid wisdom and knowledge in affairs, and of high mind and drift, they mock and turn into jest; in short, they loosen at once the whole foundations of political government. And this thing demands the greater attention, because the mischief is done by mine and sap, not by avowed hostility; neither has it yet been suspected by men as it ought to be.

13. “ *If a ruler hearken to lies, all his servants are wicked* *.”

When it is the character of a ruler to lend an easy and credulous ear, without distinction, to all whisperers and sycophants, there is breathed, as it were, quite a pestilential air from the quarter of the king, which corrupts and infects all his servants. Some watch the fears of the prince, and aggravate these by feigned reports; some stir up the furies of his jealousy, and especially against every one of greatest worth; some, by criminating others, purge their own filth and evil conscience; some flatter the ambition and desires of their friends, by calumniating and biting their competitors; some compose plots and stories against their enemies, as they would compose for the stage; and so of innumerable other cases. And thus it is with those among the prince’s servants who are of the worst disposition. But even such as are more virtuously inclined, and of better principles, when they find that their innocence gives them little protection, (since the ruler cannot distinguish between the true and the false,) lay aside this probity of cha-

* Prov. xxix. 12.

racter, and catch the gale from the court, and drive with the stream. For, as Tacitus says of Claudius, “ there is no safety with a prince whose mind takes all impressions and directions.” And Comines well expresses it, “ Better serve a master whose suspicions are without end, than one whose credulity is without measure.”

14. “ *A righteous man regardeth the life of his beast, but the tender mercies of the wicked are cruel *.*”

There is planted in man, by his very nature, a noble and excellent affection of pity; extending even to the brute animals, which, by the divine appointment, are subjected to his power. So that this pity has something in common with that of a monarch towards his subjects. It is undoubted too, that, the worthier the disposition, the greater number does its compassion extend to. For narrow and ignoble minds look upon things of this kind as no way concerning them; but that which is the more generous part of the universe, is affected by communion. We see, accordingly, that under the old law, there were not a few precepts, which were institutions of

* Prov. xii. 10.

mercy, rather than things of mere ceremony ; such as that, of *not eating the flesh with its blood* ; and others of a like kind. In the sects of the Essenes, and Pythagoreans, also, they abstained entirely from animal food. Which holds, even at this day, with a superstition inviolable, among certain natives of the Mogul's empire. Nay, the Turks, (otherwise a cruel and sanguinary nation, both by race and discipline,) yet have a custom of giving alms to brutes ; and do not suffer any vexation and torment of animals. But, lest what is now said should seem to be a plea for every kind of mercy, Solomon makes the wholesome addition, that the tender mercies of the wicked are cruel. These are, when flagitious and profligate men are spared, whom the sword of justice ought to smite. For such mercy is more cruel than cruelty itself ; since cruelty is exercised against particulars ; but that mercy arms the entire host of villains, by the impunity conferred, and slips them at the innocent.

15. “ *A fool uttereth all his mind, but a wise man keepeth it in till afterward**.”

This proverb, (in our opinion,) does not so much reprove either the weakness of light men,

* Prov. xxix. 11.

who are ready to blab out every thing ; or that boldness of spirit with which they fly at all persons and subjects, without knowledge or distinction ; or the garrulity by which they deafen others, even to nausea ; but another fault, more hidden ; namely, that most unwise and improvident management in discourse, when any one so orders his speech, (in private conference,) as to bring out all that he has in his mind, which he thinks any way pertaining to the subject, at once, and in a breath, as it were, and continued harangue. Now, this is very hurtful to business. For, in the first place, it is certain that a discourse which is divided, and thrown in by parcels, enters much deeper than one without intermission ; since, in the last, the weight of the matter is not distinctly and separately felt, nor has any time given to fix and settle ; but one reason drives another out, before it has taken full possession. Secondly, no one has such a power of happy and prevailing eloquence, as, by the first impression of his discourse, to render him whom he addresses altogether mute and speechless ; but the other too, shall have something to answer in his turn ; and, perhaps, to object. Whereupon it is found, that the things which should have been kept for confutation or rejoinder, being already forestalled and anticipated, have lost their strength and grace.

Thirdly, when, instead of pouring forth at once all that is to be said, one delivers it in portions, throwing out first this particular, and then some other, he shall observe by the countenance and answers of the person addressed, how the several points affect him, and in what part they are taken; so that he shall better know what either to suppress, or to choose, from that which remains to be said.

16. “*If the spirit of the ruler riseth up against thee, leave not thy place; for yielding pacifieth great offences* *.”

The proverb directs how one should conduct himself, when he has incurred the displeasure and wrath of his prince. And the direction is twofold. First, that he do not leave his place; and, second, that he be carefully and earnestly intent upon the remedy, as if he were under some severe sickness. For it has been customary with men, when they find their masters greatly moved against them, partly through an impatience of disgrace, and partly that they may not by

* Eccles. x. 4. The explanation has reference to the passage as it is given in the Latin Vulgate. *Si spiritus potestatem habentis ascenderit super te, locum tuum ne dimiseris; quia curatio faciet cessare magna peccata.*

their presence fret the wound, partly too that the prince may not witness their grief and humiliation, to withdraw from their charges and employments ; and sometimes even to surrender into the prince's hands those particular offices and honours which they hold. But this method of cure Solomon condemns as hurtful ; and certainly on the best grounds. For, in the first place, it makes the disgrace itself too public, whereby it happens both that the hostile and envious become bolder to injure, and the friendly more timorous to assist. In the second place, it follows by this means, that the resentment of the prince, which, if it was not so divulged and spread, would perhaps have died away of itself, is more confirmed ; and, a beginning being thus made, as it were, of the man's subversion, it is pushed on to his complete overthrow. Lastly, that withdrawing savours somewhat of dislike and hostility to the times ; thereby accumulating, on the evil of suspicion, the evil of indignation also. To the remedy belong the following things. First, let him beware, above all, that he do not, from a sort of stupidity, or even through a loftiness of mind, appear insensible to the displeasure of the prince, or not duly affected by it : that is to say, let him suit his countenance, not to a stubborn or haughty discontent, but to a grave and

temperate sadness; and likewise show himself, in whatever he does, less cheerful and joyous than common. And it will be for his interest also, to employ the service and tongue of some friend, who may at seasonable times give the prince to understand, with how deep a sorrow he is inwardly afflicted. In the next place, let him anxiously avoid even the slightest occasion, whereby either the matter itself, which gave rise to the displeasure, may be recalled ; or, in short, a handle given to the prince for taking up a resentment, or chiding him on any account before others. Thirdly, let him, with no less diligence, seek out every occasion where his service may be acceptable to the prince ; both that he may show his ready inclination to retrieve the past offence, and that his master may be sensible what sort of servant he is likely to lose by dismissing him. In the fourth place, let him either prudently shift the fault from himself; or indirectly make it appear how the thing was done with no evil design ; or even point out the malice of those who accused him to the king, or unduly exaggerated the matter. In short, let him be vigilant every way, and intent to heal.

17. "*He that is first in his own cause seemeth just; but his neighbour cometh and searcheth him.**"

The first information in any cause, if it stays for a little in the judge's mind, strikes deep root, and imbues and possesses him; so that it is hard to be worked out, unless there be detection, either of some manifest falsity in the matter of the information, or some artifice used in the exhibiting of it. For a naked and simple defence, though it be just and of greater weight, is scarcely sufficient of itself to compensate the prejudice coming by the first statement, or bring back the scale of justice to its poise, when once it hath declined. Therefore it is both safest for the judge, to anticipate nothing which respects the merits of a cause, till both parties may be heard together; and best for the defender, when he finds the judge prepossessed, to employ his greatest efforts (in so far as the cause allows) for the detection of some abuse, and intended fraud, on the part of his opponent, to mislead the judge.

* Prov. xviii. 17.

18. “*He that delicately bringeth up his servant from a child shall have him become his son at the last *.*”

According to Solomon’s advice, a measure is to be kept by princes and masters, in their favour and indulgence towards servants. And this caution is threefold. First, that they be advanced by steps, not at a stride. Secondly, that they be used sometimes to a repulse. Thirdly, as Machiavel rightly admonishes, “that they have always placed before them something farther after which to aspire.” For unless these things are observed, princes will undoubtedly be repaid by their servants in the end, not with duty and a thankful mind, but with scorn and disobedience. For, by sudden promotion comes insolence; and by the sure attainment of what is desired, an impatience of denial; and, in fine, if there is nothing left to wish for, there will be a want no less of alacrity and zeal.

* Prov. xxix. 21. It is thus translated in the Latin Vulgate. *Qui delicate a pueritia nutrit servum ostea sentiet eum contumacem.*

19. “ *Seest thou a man diligent in business, he shall stand before kings, he shall not stand before mean men **.”

Among those qualities, which, in the choice of their servants, kings chiefly consider and require, in preference to any others, the most acceptable are quickness and alacrity in the dispatch of their affairs. Men of profound wisdom are suspected by kings, as too much given to scrutinize; and able, by their powers of mind, as by an engine, to turn their masters round, unwitting and unwilling. Popular men are hated by them, as intercepting the king’s light, and drawing the eyes of the people on themselves. Intrepid men are often supposed to be turbulent, and to have more daring than is convenient. Men of worth and integrity of life are thought to be unmanageable, and not ready for all the master’s biddings. In short, there is no other virtue which has not some kind of shade, whereat the mind of a king conceives offence; only diligence to execute has nothing but what pleases. Farther, the motions of kingly minds are quick, and little patient of stops; for they conceive themselves

to have the power of effecting what they will, and that nothing more is wanting but to have it done speedily. Of all things, therefore, the most acceptable to them is dispatch.

20. "*I considered all the living which walk under the sun, with the second child that shall stand up in his stead*.*"

This proverb adverts to the lightness of men ; who are used to crowd about those designed as the successors of kings. And the root of the matter is that folly which is deeply planted in men's minds by nature ; namely, an extravagant fondness for their hopes. For there is hardly any one to be found, who does not take more pleasure in what he hopes, than in what he possesses. Besides, novelty is acceptable to man's nature, and eagerly coveted. But in the successor to a throne, these two, hope and novelty, concur. This proverb denotes the same that was observed of old, first by Pompey to Scylla, and afterwards by Tiberius of Macro, "that more men worship the rising than the setting sun." And yet those who have the rule, are not greatly moved by this, or make much account of it ; as neither Scylla nor

* Eccles. iv. 15.

Tiberius did ; but rather laugh at the levity of mankind, and will not fight with dreams ; according to his speech who called hope “ the dream of the waking.”

21. “ *There was a little city, and few men within it; and there came a great king against it, and besieged it, and built great bulwarks against it: now there was found in it a poor wise man, and he by his wisdom delivered the city; yet no man remembered that same poor man *.*”

In this parable is represented the depraved and malevolent disposition of mankind. For, in difficulties and straits, they flock, as it were, to men of wisdom and vigour, whom they may before have held in contempt. Yet, as soon as the storm has passed over, they are found altogether unmindful of their deliverers. And here Machiavell, not without reason, puts the question, “ whether prince or people is most ungrateful towards benefactors ?” So that he charges ingratitude on both. And yet this arises not entirely from want of gratitude in the prince or the people ; but to that is often added the envy of the upper class,

* Eccles. ix. 14, 15.

who are secretly grieved by the event, however prosperous and happy, because it was not brought to pass by their means; on which account they both undervalue the service, and bear down the man.

22. "*The way of the slothful man is as an hedge of thorns*.*"

The proverb most beautifully shows how sloth is full of labour in the end. For it is the effect of industry and diligent preparation to save the feet from stumbling-blocks, and to smooth the road, before it is entered upon; but he that is slothful, and delays all things to the last moment of performance, cannot fail, perpetually, and at every step, to walk as it were among briars and thorns, which immediately catch and hinder him. The same may likewise be seen in the management of a household; where, if attention and forethought be employed, every thing proceeds calmly, and in a manner self-moved, without noise or bustle; but where these are wanting, then, if occasion comes for any more than ordinary movement, all things occur to be done in a heap, the servants in a tumult, and the house resounding.

* Prov. xv. 19.

23. “*To have respect of persons is not good; for, for a piece of bread that man will transgress*.*”

In this proverb is signified, with the greatest wisdom, that facility of disposition is more hurtful in a judge than corruption by bribery. For gifts are by no means offered in all cases; but there is hardly any suit, where something is not found that may pervert the mind of a judge, if he has respect of persons. For of one he shall have respect, as being well with the people; of another, as an evil-speaker; of another, as a man of wealth; another, as a favourite; another, as recommended by a friend. In short, every thing is full of iniquity, when respect of persons has the sway; and for any the slightest reason, as for a piece of bread, judgment will be perverted.

24. “*A poor man that oppresseth the poor, is as a sweeping rain, which leaveth no food†.*”

This allegory was anciently expressed, and represented, by the fable of the full leech and the

* Prov. xxviii. 21.

† Prov. xxviii. 3.

empty. For oppression by him that is poor and famished, is much heavier than the oppression of him that is rich and replenished ; because it tries all the shifts of extortion, and pries and searches into every corner of the money bag. The same used likewise to be shown by the similitude of the sponges ; of which the dry sucks powerfully, the moist not so much. It contains, however, a useful admonition—both to kings, that they do not commit the government of provinces, or the posts of magistracy, to men who are needy or broken ; and also to the people, that they do not leave their monarchs to struggle with too great want.

25. "*A righteous man falling down before the wicked, is a troubled fountain, and a corrupt spring* *.

The proverb teaches, that governments are, above all things, to be careful of an unjust and disgraceful judgment, in any remarkable and important cause ; especially where it is not a guilty man that is absolved, but an innocent that is condemned. For wrongs which are abroad among individuals, trouble, indeed, and defile the waters of justice, but only in the rills ; whereas iniquitous

judgments, such as we have mentioned, and from which examples are drawn, pollute and deprave the fountains of justice themselves. For when a tribunal thus gives place to injustice, the condition of things is changed, as it were, into that of public robbery—and then, indeed, *man becomes a wolf to man.*

26. “*Make no friendship with an angry man, and with a furious man thou shalt not go *.*”

In proportion to the strictness with which the rights of friendship among good men are to be observed, and cultivated, is the greater care to be used, from the very beginning, in regard to a prudent choice of friends. We are, in every thing, to bear with the temper and manners of a friend, so far as concerns ourselves. But when they impose a necessity upon us, in respect of our character and behaviour towards others, the condition of friendship is then very hard and difficult. Accordingly, it is of the first importance, as Solomon directs, for the ease and comfort of life, that we should not mingle our interests with wrathful men, and such as are given to provoke quarrels,

* Prov. xxii. 24.

or take up grudges. For friends of this sort will perpetually entangle us in disputes and factions ; and will thus compel us either to break off our friendship, or be wanting to our own safety.

27. “ *He that covereth a transgression seeketh love ; but he that repeateth a matter separateth very friends**.”

In the pursuit of peace, and reconciliation of minds, there are two methods; one, which begins with amnesty ; the other, which begins with a rehearsal of the wrongs, followed up by apologies and excuses. It was the opinion, as I well remember, of a person possessing great sense and wisdom, “ that he who proposes an agreement, without repeating the particulars of the quarrel, rather cheats the mind with the pleasures of concord, than brings it to an even frame.” But Solomon, wiser certainly than he, thinks otherwise ; approving the amnesty, and forbidding the repetition. For these are the disadvantages of repeating : first, that it is like rubbing the sore ; and again, the imminent danger of a new altercation, (since the parties will never agree on the

* Prov. xvii. 9. *Qui cclat delictum quacrit amicitiam ; sed qui altero sermone repetit separat foederatos.* LAT. VULG.

terms and manner of the injury ;) and, in fine, that it leads to apologies, whereas both sides would rather seem to have pardoned an offence, than to have admitted an excuse.

28. “ *In all labour there is profit ; but the talk of the lips tendeth only to penury *.*”

Solomon, in this Proverb, distinguishes between the labour of the tongue, and of the hand, in respect to their fruit; as if by the one came poverty, and by the other profit, (or abundance.) For it happens almost constantly, that those who are great babblers, and speak big, and promise largely, are needy men, and take no advantage by those things of which they talk. Besides, they are, for the most part, without any industry or diligence in working; but feed and sate themselves on words merely, as it were on wind. And, truly, as the poet says, *the silent man is sure.* He who is conscious of advancing in his work, takes comfort, and holds his peace. But he who is conscious, on the other hand, that he is catching nothing but air, is to others full of empty vaunts.

* Prov. xiv. 23.

29. “ *Open rebuke is better than secret love *.*”

This proverb censures the weakness of friends, who do not use the privilege of friendship, in freely and boldly admonishing their friend, as well of his mistakes as of his dangers. For, what should I do? (a friend of this easy nature commonly says,) or where should I turn? I love him to the utmost, no one more; and, if any thing adverse should befall him, would willingly put myself in his room; but I well know his disposition; if I dealt openly with him, I should wound him deeply, or at least grieve him much, and yet gain nothing, but estrange him from my friendship, rather than prevail with him to forego things thus rooted in his nature. Such a friend Solomon condemns for soft and useless; and declares that more benefit is to be derived from an open foe, than from a friend of this description; since, from an enemy, one may perhaps hear, in derision, what a friend keeps in through excess of tenderness.

* Prov. xxvii. 5.

30. “*The wisdom of the prudent is to understand his way ; but the folly of fools is deceit.*”*

There are two sorts of wisdom ; one, the true and sound ; the other degenerate and false, which Solomon does not hesitate to call by the name of folly. He who commits himself to the former, takes heed to his own ways and steps, looking forward to dangers, and considering the remedies ; using the assistance of good men, arming himself against the bad ; cautious in advancing, not unprepared for retreat ; watchful of opportunities, vigorous against opposition ; and, in numberless other ways, having a regard to his own actions, and the directing of his walk. But the second kind is altogether pieced up of deceptions and artifices, and places its hope entirely in the circumvention of others, and moulding them to its pleasure. This the proverb deservedly explodes, not only as wicked, but even as foolish. For, in the *first* place, it is by no means one of the things which are in our power, nor does it even rest upon one constant rule ; but new stratagems are every day to be thought of, as the old grow stale, and

* Prov. xiv. 8.

out of date. *Secondly*, He who has once incurred the name and reputation of a sly and cunning man, has altogether deprived himself of that which is the chief instrument for the conduct of affairs, namely, trust ; and will consequently find all things to accord little with his wishes. *Lastly*, These arts, whatever they may seem to have of beauty and delight, are yet in most cases destitute of effect: which Tacitus has well remarked; namely, that crafty and audacious counsels are, in prospect, happy ; but, in the execution, hard ; and, in the event, unprosperous."

31. "*Be not righteous over much, neither make thyself over wise : why shouldest thou destroy thyself* ?*"

"There are times," Tacitus observes, "inevitably fatal to great virtue." And this ruin falls on men distinguished by their probity and uprightness, sometimes unexpectedly, sometimes long foreseen. But if there be added wisdom, also, that is to say, if they are cautious and vigilant in regard to their own safety, then they reap this, moreover, that their fall comes suddenly, from dangers altogether hidden and dark ; by

* Eccles. vii. 16.

which means, while they escape open enmities, so their destruction assails them unprepared. But as to that *overmuch*, which the proverb puts, (since these are the words not of a Periander, but of Solomon, who, though he often marks what is evil in men's lives, never enjoins it,) we are to understand thereby, not real virtue, (in which there is no excess,) but the empty and invidious affectation and ostentation of it. Tacitus points at something like this in regard to Lepidus; setting it down as a thing miraculous, that he who had never lent himself to any slavish counsels, had yet remained in safety during times of so great ferocity. "And here," says he, "the mind secretly inquires, whether these things are governed by fate ; or if it be likewise in our own power to keep some course between an unseemly compliance and an inconsiderate resistance, clear at once both of danger and disgrace."

32. "*Give instruction to a wise man, and he will be yet wiser*.*"

The proverb distinguishes between that wisdom which has grown and matured into a real

* Prov. ix. 9. *Da sapienti occasionem, et addetur ei sapientia.* LAT. VULG.

habit, and that which merely swims in the brain and conceit, or is a boast of words, but has struck no roots of any depth. Since the first, when opportunity for its exercise presents, is immediately quickened, and girds to work, and dilates itself, so as to appear increased in its dimension ; whereas the other, which before the occasion was brisk, when the occasion arrives is amazed and confused ; so that even he, who supposed himself to possess it, begins to question whether his pre-notions concerning it have not been dreams, and an empty speculation.

33. “ *He that blesseth his friend with a loud voice, rising early in the morning, it shall be counted a curse to him**.”

Praises which are moderate and well timed, and drawn forth by the occasion, conduce much to the reputation of men, and even to their fortune : but those which are unmeasured, and noisy, and importunately lavished, are of no service ; nay, rather, (according to the proverb,) are exceedingly injurious. For, in the first place, they evidently betray themselves either to proceed from too great partiality, or to be purpose-

* Prov. xxvii. 4.

ly pretended, more for the sake of winning the person commended by a loud and hollow panegyric, than of gracing him with real qualities. Secondly, modest and sparing praise commonly invites those who are present to add something farther to it; while that which is prodigal, and excessive, leads them rather to take off something, and detract. Thirdly, (which is the capital matter,) this excess begets ill will to him who is overpraised; since all extravagant praises are considered as having a view to the disparagement of others not less deserving.

34. “*As in water face answereth to face, so the heart of man to man**.”

The proverb distinguishes between the minds of the wise †, and of other men; comparing the first to water, or a mirror, which receives the forms and images of things, while the rest are like earth, or unpolished stone, where nothing is reflected. And the mind of a wise man is the

* Prov. xxvii. 19.

† In some of the Latin versions this idea is comprehended: *Quomodo in aquis resplendent facies, sic corda hominum manifesta sunt prudentibus.*

Quomodo in aquis resplendent vultus perspicientium, sic corda hominum manifesta sunt prudentibus.

more aptly compared to a mirror, for this reason, that in a mirror the image of the gazer may be seen, as well as the images of others; which is not granted to the eye itself, without the help of a mirror. But if the mind of the wise be so capacious, that it is able to mark and distinguish between innumerable dispositions and characters, it remains that we endeavour to render it not less various in the application, than in the representation.

“ The wise can use all characters and times *.”

Note.—It may be proper to add here the observation made by the author, in the second book of the *Advancement of Learning*, when concluding the few examples which he had given in that work, under this head of his subject. “ Thus have I staid somewhat longer upon these sentences politic of Solomon, than is agreeable to the proportion of an example; led with a desire to give authority to this part of knowledge, which I noted as deficient, by so excellent a precedent; and have also attended them with brief observations, such as to my understanding offer no vio-

* “ *Qui sapit innumeris moribus aptus erit.*”

lence to the sense, though I know they may be applied to a more divine use; but it is allowed, even in divinity, that some interpretations, yea and some writings, have more of the eagle than others; but, taking them as instructions for life, they might have received large discourse, if I would have broken them, and illustrated them by documents and examples."

*EXEMPLA PHILOSOPHIÆ SECUNDUM
PARABOLAS ANTIQUAS.*

De Aug. Scient. b. ii. c. 13.

EXAMPLES OF PHILOSOPHY, ACCORDING TO
THE ANCIENT FABLES.

PREFACE*.

THE earliest antiquity, (with the exception of what is delivered to us in the sacred Scriptures,) is wrapt in oblivion and silence ; what is silent in antiquity, has been taken up by the poets in their fables ; and to the fables have, at length, succeeded the writings which we now possess : so that the interior and recesses of antiquity are in a manner divided and separated from the memory and knowledge of the after ages, by the veil of the fables, which has intervened and opposed an impediment between the things that have perished and those that subsist. I doubt not that, in the opinion of the greater number, I shall appear to

* This Preface accompanied the author's subsequent work, *De Sapientia Veterum*; being a continuation and enlargement of his commentary on the ancient fables. As it forms an equally fit Introduction to these examples taken from the treatise *De Augmentis*, a translation of it here cannot be considered out of place.

be occupied in a kind of sport and pastime, and to take nearly the same liberty in applying the fables, which was taken by the poets themselves in feigning them: and this indeed is a privilege which I might justly use; namely, in the midst of more difficult contemplations, to intermix such things, either for solace of my own meditation, or others reading. Nor am I ignorant what an inconstant thing fable is; admitting to be drawn, and even led, in many different ways; and how much the aptness and practice of wit can avail; so that things, which in reality were never thought of, may nevertheless be ingeniously imputed. Besides which, I remembered, on reflection, that this matter has already been corrupted in the use; since many, who would obtain for their own inventions and opinions the reverence of antiquity, have endeavoured to bring over to these the fables of the poets—which is an early and frequent vanity, not by any means of recent origin, or rare occurrence. For, even of old, Chrysippus, like some interpreter of dreams, used to ascribe to the earliest of the poets the opinions of the Stoicks; and, more absurdly still, the frolics and fancies of the poets, in their transformations of bodies, have been applied by the chemists to their experiments of the furnace. All this, I say, has been well examined and weighed; and I have seen and

marked all that levity and intemperance of wits, in the matter of allegories ; but have not, by any means, departed from my purpose on that account. For, in the first place, it is not to be allowed, that the folly and laxness of a few should detract from the dignity of parables in general : which would seem, indeed, to be a thing even profane and audacious ; since religion takes delight in such veils and shadows ; so that he who disallows them, may almost be said to forbid the commerce between things divine and human. But let us look to it as a matter of human wisdom ; and, for myself, I confess freely, and without reserve, my leaning to this opinion, that not a few fables of the ancient poets contained in them, from the very first, a secret meaning and allegory ; whether it is that I am possessed by an admiration of antiquity, or that, in certain of their fables, I find so great and so manifest a similitude and conjunction with the thing signified, as well in the texture of the story itself, as in the propriety of the names by which the persons or actors in the fable come forth distinguished, and as it were inscribed, that no one may consistently question, but that such significations were intended and thought of from the beginning, and purposely shadowed out. For who is there so dull, and so blinded to the clearest light, that when he hears of Fame,

after the extinction of the giants, being born as a kind of posthumous sister to them, does not refer it to the murmurs of factions, and the seditious rumours which usually go abroad for a time, on the suppression of rebellions? Or, when he hears that the giant Typhon cut the sinews of Jupiter, and carried them away, and that Mercury again stole and restored them to him, does not immediately perceive how this applies to the successful rebellions against kings, which cut the nerves both of their treasure and authority; yet so, that through mild speeches, and prudent proclamations, the minds of their subjects are, not long thereafter, as it were by stealth, reconciled to them, and the kingly power recovered? Or, when he hears how, in that memorable expedition of the gods against the giants, the braying of Silenus's ass was of the greatest efficacy in putting the giants to flight, does not clearly perceive this to be feigned of the vast attempts of rebels, which are most frequently dissipated by empty rumours and vain alarms? Then, as to the aptness of names, and their indications, can there be any by whom this is not understood? For example, that Metis, the wife of Jupiter, signifies counsel; Typhon, swelling, (or insurrection;) Pan, the universe; Nemesis, revenge, (or retribution;) and the like? Neither let it move any one, that something of history is

at times found therein; or that certain particulars are added for the sake of ornament; or that there is a confusion of times; or that a part is taken from one fable and adjected to another, so as to graft a new allegory. For all this happened of necessity, in things which were the inventions of men, not only separated in age, but differing in institution; some being more ancient, others of later times; and again, some having an eye to natural things, others to civil. But we have another, and not slight intimation of a hidden and inward meaning; that some of these fables are found, in the very narration, to be so absurd and ridiculous, as to show the parable even afar off, and, as it were, to proclaim it aloud. For a story that is probable, we may believe to have been feigned with the design of pleasing, and as a semblance of history; but that which could not have come into the mind of any one to suppose, or relate, seems to be contrived for other purposes. What sort of fiction, for example, is this? that Jupiter took Metis to wife, and, as soon as he found her to be pregnant, devoured her; whereby he himself was impregnated, and brought forth Pallas, armed, from his head? I am fully persuaded, that there is not a mortal existing, to whom a thing so monstrous, and out of the roads of thought, would occur, even as,

a dream. But that which has prevailed with me above all, and carries the greatest weight, is that, in my opinion, many of the fables were by no means the invention of those who recite and celebrate them, namely, Homer, Hesiod, and the rest. For, if it clearly appeared to me that they had flowed from that age, and from those authors by whom they are commemorated and transmitted to us, then certainly it would not have occurred to my mind, (and so far as I can estimate the matter,) to expect or conjecture any thing great or elevated, from an origin of this kind. But to any one who considers the subject more attentively, it will appear that these fables are narrated and handed down, as things already credited and received, not as things worked up and presented, for the first time. Besides, as they are related in different ways by writers nearly of the same age, you may easily discern what they have in common, as taken from the ancient memorials, and wherein they differ, as severally added by those who adorned them. And, with me, this has increased their repute ; as proving that they were neither of the age nor invention of the poets themselves, but rather sacred and faint remains of a better time, and which, descending from the traditions of more ancient nations, had fallen into the trumpets and flutes of the Greeks. But,

if any one shall be obstinately resolved to maintain, that the allegory of the fable has in all cases been added and supplied, and was in no instance native and original ; I shall not farther molest him ; but rather give him credit for that gravity of judgment which he thus affects, though it be somewhat dull, and even leaden ; and I shall assail him (if he deserves it) in another and altogether different way. There is found and acknowledged among men, a twofold use of parables ; and, what is more wonderful, these are applied to contrary purposes. For parables serve as a covering and veil ; and, again, they serve for light and illustration. Laying aside the former of these uses, then, (rather than dispute the matter,) and taking the ancient fables as things indeterminate, and devised only for amusement, still there remains, beyond doubt, that latter use, which cannot by any violence of wit be wrested from us ; nor will any one, (if only moderately learned,) deny this manner of teaching to be a grave and sober thing, not only free from all levity, but highly useful, and at times even necessary, in science ; namely, that in discoveries which are new, and remote from common opinions, and altogether abstruse, the human understanding may be approached more easily, and with less resistance, by the way of para-

bles. In ancient times, accordingly, when the discoveries and conclusions of human reason, even such as are now trite and vulgar, were for the time new and strange, all things were full of every kind of fable, and enigma, and parable, and similitude; and these were employed, not as an artifice intended to conceal, but as a method of giving instruction; because of the minds of men being at that time rude, and impatient, and nearly incapable of any thing subtle, unless what fell under the sense. For, as hieroglyphics were more ancient than letters, so were parables more ancient than arguments. And, even now, if any one would pour new light into the minds of men, regarding any subject, and that without pain or inconvenience, he ought, by all means, to pursue the same road, and have recourse to the help of similitudes. What has been said, therefore, I conclude thus. The wisdom of the first age either was great, or it was fortunate; great, if the figure or trope was purposely contrived; fortunate, if men, while engaged in something else, have afforded subject and handle for contemplations of such worth. As for my present labour, (if there is any thing of value in it,) I shall think it not ill bestowed in either case. For I shall throw light, either upon antiquity, or upon things themselves. Nor can I be ignorant that

this matter has been attempted by others: but, nevertheless, that I may speak out what I think, and that not overweeningly, yet with freedom, the honour and profit from such endeavours, however great and laborious, have nearly perished; while men without skill, and whose learning extends not beyond certain common places, have applied the interpretation of parables to some general and ordinary matters, and have not reached their true import, and genuine propriety, and deeper exposition. But (if I mistake not,) I shall be found in familiar things to be new; and, leaving behind what is open and plain, to have proceeded to that which is more remote and richer.

EXAMPLE IN NATURAL PHILOSOPHY.—OF THE UNIVERSE; FROM THE FABLE OF PAN*.

THE ancients have left the birth of Pan doubtful. For some assert him to be the offspring of Mercury: others allot to him a very different

* For the allusions to fabulous history, in this and the two following examples, see, among other writers, Ovid's Metamorphoses and Fasti, Macrobius, Cicero de Natura Deorum, Hygini Fabulæ, and Poeticon Astronomicon.

kind of origin ; pretending that all the suitors of Penelope shared her favour, and that Pan was the common fruit of the promiscuous bed. Nor is that third account of his generation to be overlooked, according to which he is given out by some to have been the son of Jupiter, and *Hybris*, (or *Pride*.) Whatever was his birth, the Destinies are said to have been his sisters, who dwelt in a subterraneous cave ; but Pan lived in the open air. The picture of Pan is thus drawn by antiquity : he is horned, his horns tapering to a point, and reaching up to heaven ; his whole body rough, and covered with hair ; and a great length of beard. His figure is biform, human above, but half savage, and ending in the feet of a goat. He bore, for ensigns of his power, in his left hand, a pipe compacted of seven reeds ; in his right, a crook or staff, bent and inflected at the top. He was dressed in a covering of panther's skin. The powers and offices ascribed to him are these : he was the god of hunters, shepherds, and all manner of husbandmen ; he presided over mountains ; and, next to Mercury, was the herald of the gods. He was, moreover, accounted the head and director of the nymphs ; who used perpetually to lead the dance and trip around him. The Satyrs likewise accompanied him ; and, elder than them, the Sileni. He had also the power

of infusing terrors, particularly such as are vain and superstitious; which, it is known, have the name of *panic*. As to his actions, not many are recorded of him. The chief is, that he challenged Cupid to wrestle, but was overcome by him in the strife. He likewise entangled and held the giant Typhon in the toils. And they farther relate, that when Ceres, in grief and indignation for the rape of Proserpine, had concealed herself, and all the gods were busily employed in searching for her, and had dispersed by different ways for the purpose, it happened to Pan alone, through a kind of good fortune, while he was hunting, to discover and point her out. He had the boldness also to contend with Apollo for the prize of music, and, by the judgment of Midas, was even preferred; for which judgment Midas was requited with ass's ears, but wore them privately and undivulged. No amours of Pan are mentioned, or at least very few; which, in a crowd of deities all so prodigally given to love, may appear strange. It is only told of him, that he was enamoured of Echo, who is also supposed to have been his wife; and of one nymph besides, called Syrinx; which passion he owed to the anger and revenge of Cupid, whom he had been so bold as to challenge. Once, too, he is said to have had an assignation with the moon in a deep grove. Nei-

ther had he any progeny, (which is likewise uncommon, since the male deities, in particular, were exceedingly prolific;) except that a certain low maid, of the name of Iambe, is ascribed to him as his daughter, who had a practice of entertaining strangers with ridiculous tales, and who, by some, was thought to be his offspring by his wife Echo. A high fable, it must be acknowledged, big and distended, as it were, with secrets and mysteries of nature.

Pan (as even the name itself signifies) represents and sets forth the universe of things, or nature. Concerning its origin, there are, and can be, only two opinions. For it either sprung from Mercury, that is to say, the divine word, (which the sacred writings place beyond controversy, and which even those philosophers perceived who are accounted the most divine;) or it sprung from the confused seeds of things. Certain of the philosophers, indeed, laid it down that the seeds of things were infinite substances; whence flowed that theory of *homoiomeri*, which Anaxagoras either invented or made famous. But some, with more penetration and soberness, held it sufficient for explaining the variety of things, that their seeds should be the same in substance, and diverse in figures, yet these certain and defined; and accounted for the rest, by position and union of the

seeds in regard one to another; from which source was derived that doctrine of the atoms, to which Democritus betook himself; but Leucippus was the author. Others again, though they asserted one principle of things, (Thales water, Anaximander air, Heraclitus fire,) yet asserted that principle itself to be one in action, though of diverse and distributive power, as that in which the seeds of all things were latent. But those who represented matter altogether stripped and shapeless, and indifferent to forms, (as Plato and Aristotle,) came both much nearer, and much more easily, to the figure of the allegory. For they set forth matter as a public courtesan, and forms as the suitors. So that all the opinions concerning the principles of things return hither, and are brought back to that division, that the world is either the produce of Mercury, or of Penelope, and all the suitors. But the third derivation of Pan is of such a character, that the Greeks may seem, either through the channel and report of Egypt, or by whatever other way, to have had some hint of the Hebrew mysteries. For it pertains to the condition of the world, not in its mere nativity and lineage, but after the fall of Adam, exposed and forfeit to death and corruption. Since that condition was the offspring of God, and of Sin, (or Pride,) and so remains.

For the kind of Adam's sin was pride ; seeing he wished to become like God. Thus may that threefold story of the birth of Pan even be considered as the true, if we distinguish rightly both of matters and times. For this universe, (such as we now contemplate and embrace it,) has its original from the divine word, the medium being a chaos of matter, (which itself, too, was the work of God,) and falsehood, and thereby corruption, creeping in.

To the nature of things, the fates of things are truly given out and declared to be sisters ; for what are called fates are the beginnings, and durations, and extinctions of things ; their depressions likewise, and heights, and difficulties, and felicities ; and, in short, all the conditions of the individual ; which, however, almost escape notice, except where it is an individual of dignity, (as a man, or a city, or a nation.) But into these so various conditions, Pan, that is to say, the nature of things, draws those several individuals ; so that (in respect to individuals,) the chain of nature, and the thread of the Destinies are, as it were, the same thing. In addition to these, the ancients have feigned Pan to live always in the open air, but the Destinies to dwell under a great subterranean cave, and from thence to fly to men suddenly, and with the greatest swiftness ; be-

cause nature and the face of the universe is visible and open, but the fates of individuals occult and rapid. Or, though fate should be understood more largely, as denoting all events whatsoever, and not the more remarkable only, still, even in that sense, it agrees excellently with the universe of things; since, of the order of nature, there is nothing so small that it happens without a cause, and again nothing so great that it has not a dependence on some other; so that the fabric itself of nature embraces in its bosom and lap every event, both the least and the greatest, and brings them forth, in its own time, by an appointed law. It is not to be wondered, then, if the Destinies be introduced as the sisters of Pan; and, without question, the legitimate. Whereas, fortune is a child of the vulgar, and pleased only the less solid among the philosophers. And, in truth, Epicurus seems to have spoken not only profanely but foolishly also, when he said, "that it is better to believe the fable of the gods than to assert fate;" as if there could be any thing in the universe insular, and cut off from the connexion of things. But Epicurus, accommodating and subjecting his natural philosophy (as is plain from his own words,) to his moral, would admit no opinion which should press and disquiet the mind, and vex or disturb that *euthymia*, (which he had borrowed

from Democritus.) Giving way, therefore, to the sweetness of his cogitations, rather than patient of the truth, he openly threw off the yoke ; rejecting at once both the necessity of fate and the fear of the gods. But enough has been said of this sisterhood of the destinies to Pan.

Next, horns are given to the world ; and these broader at the base, and sharp at the vertex. Because every nature in the universe is pointed like a pyramid. For individuals, in which the basis of nature is extended, are infinite ; these are collected into species, which are likewise manifold ; species again rise into genera ; and these, still ascending, are contracted into more general ; till at last nature seems to meet, as it were, in a point, or unity ; which is signified by that pyramidal figure of Pan's horns. Nor is it at all wonderful that the horns of Pan should touch the very sky ; since the heights of nature, or universal ideas, reach in a manner even to divine. And hence that celebrated chain of Homer, (namely, of natural causes,) was reported as fixed to the foot of Jupiter's throne : neither has any one (so far as we know,) treated of metaphysic, and of those things in nature which are eternal and immovable, and a little withdrawn his mind from the flux of things, without falling, at the same time, into natural theology ; so near and ready

is the passage from that vertex of the pyramid to things divine.

Again, the body of Nature is represented, with the utmost elegance and truth, as covered with hair, because of the natural rays: for the rays are like the hair or pile of nature; and all things nearly are either more or less radiant; which in the faculty of vision is most evident, and not less in the magnetic power, and all which operates distantly. For, whatever operates to a distance may be said to emit rays. But, most of all, the beard of Pan is prominent, because the rays of the heavenly bodies, and particularly of the sun, have their operation, and penetrate, from the greatest distance; so that they manifestly mould and subdue the exterior parts of the earth, and even the inward, to some extent, and impregnate and vivify them. Besides, the allegory of Pan's beard is the more elegant, that the sun himself, when, having his upper body wrapt in a cloud, the rays break forth from below, is, even to the eye, visibly bearded.

Farther, the body of Nature is most fitly pictured of a double form, on account of the difference between the superior and inferior bodies. For the first, because of their beauty, and the equality and constancy of their motion, and because of their sway over the earth and things

earthly, are represented properly under the human figure, since the human nature partakes of order and dominion; whereas the other, because of their disturbance and unsettled movements, and subjugation to the heavenly, may well enough be likened to a brute animal. The same biform description of his person has a reference likewise to the participation of species. For no species of nature can be regarded as simple, but as partaking, in a manner, of two, and concrete. Thus man has something of the brute, the brute something of the plant, the plant something of dead matter; and all things are in reality biform, and compounded of a higher species and a lower. Again, that is a most ingenious allegory of the goat's feet, representing the tendency of terrestrial bodies upward towards the region of the air and sky, where also they become pensile, and are thence thrown down rather than descend. For the goat is a climbing animal, and delights to hang from rocks, and stay on precipices; as even things destined for the lower globe likewise do, and that in wonderful ways, which is very manifest in clouds and meteors. Nay, it is not without reason, that Gilbert, who has written concerning the magnet with the utmost labour, and in the way of experiment, threw forth a doubt, whether heavy bodies, perhaps, after a long dist-

ance from the earth, may not gradually lay aside their motion towards the lower regions.

The insignia in the hands of Pan are next described as twofold ; one of harmony, the other of power. For the pipe of seven reeds evidently denotes the concert and harmony of things ; or the concord, with discord mixed, which is accomplished by the motion of the seven wandering stars. Neither do we find in the heavens, those of the seven planets excepted, any other wanderings or manifest expatiations, which, adjusted and tempered with the equality of the fixed stars, and the perpetual and unchangeable distance of these one from another, are able at once to maintain and excite the continuance of the species and the flux of the individuals. Yet if there be any lesser planets which are not seen, and likewise any more considerable mutation in the heaven, (as in some superlunar comets,) these seem, in truth, to be as pipes either altogether mute, or giving a sound only at times ; and of such a kind, that their operations either do not reach to us, or do not long interrupt that harmony of the seven pipes of Pan.

That crook of power, too, is a noble metaphor ; signifying the ways of nature, partly straight and partly oblique. More particularly, the staff or rod is curved near the upper part ; because near-

ly the whole workings of Divine Providence in the world are by rounds and compasses ; so that one thing might appear to be doing, while another thing is really done ; as the selling of Joseph into Egypt, and the like. Even in every human government of more than ordinary wisdom, those who sit at the helm, when they wish to bring on and introduce what is for the interest of the people, do it with greater advantage by covered and indirect methods, than were possible directly. Nay, (what may, perhaps, seem wonderful,) in things merely natural, you will more easily deceive than force nature ; and, therefore, things which come by a direct course are frustrated, and obstruct themselves ; while, on the other hand, the indirect and winding way flows softly, and takes effect.

The vest and covering of Pan is very ingeniously feigned to have been of the panther's skin, because all over spotted. For the sky is dropped with stars, the sea with islands, and the earth with flowers ; and even individual things are commonly variegated about the surface, which is like their robe.

Then the employment of Pan could not have been painted more to the life, or better explained, than by describing him as the god of hunters. For all natural action, and by consequence all motion

and progress, is nothing else than chase. Thus both sciences and arts pursue their works ; and human counsels pursue their ends ; and all natural things, either their food to preserve them, or their pleasures and delights to perfect them, (since all chase is either for prey, or indulgence of the mind;) and that in skilful and quick-scented ways.

“ The greedy lioness the wolf pursues,
The wolf the kid, the wanton kid the browse *.”

Pan is likewise the god of those in general who live a country life; because men of this sort live more according to nature ; whereas, in cities and courts, nature is spoiled by too much culture ; so that what the poet has passionately spoken is, by reason of such dainties, even true of nature ;

“ The girl herself is least of what you see †.”

Again, Pan is said more especially to preside over mountains, because in mountains and elevated places the nature of things is laid open, and more subjected to the eye and observation.

That Pan is, second to Mercury, the herald of

* *Torva leæna lupum sequitur, lupus ipse capellam,
Florentem cytisum sequitur lasciva capella.*

† “ *Pars minima est ipsa puella sui.*”

the gods is an allegory plainly divine; since, next to the word of God, the image itself of the world proclaims the divine power and wisdom. Which the sacred poet, too, has sung: “ The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament showeth his handy work.”

Farther, Pan takes delight in the nymphs, that is to say, the soul; for the souls of the living are the delight of the world. And he is rightly made to be their commander; because they follow every one their several nature, as a guide; and dance and lead their measures round it, with an infinite variety, each as it were in their native step, with never-ending movement. Accordingly, one in later times has ingeniously reduced all the faculties of the soul to motion; and remarked on the pride and precipitation of certain among the ancients, who, viewing and contemplating the memory, and fancy, and reason, with their eyes prematurely fixed, have overlooked the cogitative power, which is the chief. For both he who remembers, or even calls to mind, thinks; and he who imagines, in like manner thinks; and he who reasons, certainly thinks: in short, the soul, whether admonished by sense, or left to itself, and whether in the offices of the intellect, or those of the affections and the will, beats to the tune of its thoughts; which is signified by that dancing of

the nymphs. And along with them go perpetually the Satyrs and Sileni; namely, youth and age; for to every thing there is a certain season that is sportful, and delights in motion; and, after that, a season of weariness and thirst: and to him, perhaps, who considers them truly, the pursuits of either age may appear (as they did to Democritus,) ridiculous and ugly, like a satyr or a silenus.

As to the panic terrors, this conveys instruction full of wisdom. For the common nature has impressed upon all that live, a fear and dread, as the preserver of their life and being, and for shunning and warding off the evils that assail. Yet the same nature knows not how to observe a measure; but, with the wholesome, still mixes fanciful and vain alarms; so that (if an inward survey were allowed) all things, especially the human, are replete with panic fears; and most of all in the vulgar, who are beyond measure burdened and agitated by superstition, (which is in truth nothing else than a panic terror,) and especially in difficult, and dangerous, and adverse times. Neither does that superstition reign among the vulgar only; but, from the opinion of the vulgar, also passes, at times, and invades the wiser sort; as Epicurus has divinely said, (if his other discourses had been in the like strain,) “ it is not

profane to deny the gods of the vulgar, but profane to apply to the gods the opinions of the vulgar."

As for Pan's audacity, and his challenge and fight with Cupid, the allusion is, that matter is not without some desire and appetite towards a dissolution of the world, and a relapse into that ancient chaos; if its spiteful endeavour was not repressed and brought into subjection, through the prevailing harmony of things, (represented by love or Cupid.) Very happily, therefore, for man and for all things, it is ordered by fate, or rather by the unbounded goodness of God, that the issue of the combat is adverse to Pan, and he retreats discomfited. That story, too, of Typhon entangled in the toils, has a reference altogether of the same kind; because, however vast sometimes, and unwonted the tumours of things may be, (and it is that which Typhon signifies,) whether swellings of the ocean, or swellings of clouds, or swellings of the earth, or whatever else, yet the nature of things involves and coerces such exuberances and elations, under an inextricable net, and in a manner binds them down with an adamantine chain.

Farther, when the finding of Ceres is ascribed to this god, and that while he was hunting, yet was denied to the other deities, though engaged in diligent search, and occupied with that very ob-

jeet, it is a hint full of truth and wisdom; namely, that the invention of things useful to life and culture, is not to be expected from abstract philosophy, represented by the deities of the upper class, though they should give their whole strength to the work; but from Pan alone, that is to say, a sagacious experience, and universal acquaintance with the things of the world; which commonly, too, lights upon such discoveries, by a sort of accident, and, as it were, in hunting. For all the most useful inventions are owing to experience, and have in a manner been thrown out to men as boons, and casually.

With respect to that musical contest, and the issue of it, there is here conveyed a salutary instruction, and one by which the human reason and judgment, in the times of their exultation and excess, may be put into the fetters of soberness. For there seems to be a twofold harmony and music, as it may be called—one, of the divine wisdom; the other, of human reasoning. Since, according to human judgment, and as it were to mortal ears, the administration of the world, and of all things, and the more secret determinations of heaven, sound a little harsh and somehow dissonant; and though this ignorance be fitly distinguished by ass's ears, yet these ears themselves are worn con-

cealed, and not openly. Nor is the deformity of this thing seen or noted by the multitude.

Lastly, it is not in the least to be wondered, that there should be no mention of Pan's amours, his marriage with Echo excepted ; for the world, by possession of itself, possesses all things ; but he who loves, wishes to obtain ; and in abundance, there is no room for desire. The world, therefore, can have no loves, nor any desire of attaining, (being full in itself,) unless it be the love of discourse. This is the nymph Echo, (a thing not substantial, but vocal;) or, if it be more exact, Syrinx * ; that is to say, when words and sounds are regulated by certain numbers, whether of poesy or rhetoric, and as it were by tune. But it is excellently devised, that, of all discourse or speech, Echo alone is given in marriage to the universe ; for that, in fine, is true philosophy, which most faithfully returns the accents of the world itself, and is, in a manner, written down while the world is dictating, and is nothing else but its image and reflexion, neither adds any thing of its own, but merely iterates and repeats. As to that story of Pan having at one time enticed

* Syrinx, a reed—*calamus palustris*. The transformation of this Arcadian nymph is narrated in the first book of the Metamorphoses. The reference here is obviously to the reed, anciently used as a pen.

Luna into a deep wood, it refers seemingly to the conjunction of sense with things heavenly or divine. For the condition of Endymion and of Pan are different. To Endymion, while asleep, the Moon comes down of her own accord ; seeing that things divine sometimes flow spontaneous on the intellect, when lulled, and withdrawn from the senses ; but if they are called and spoken to by the sense, as if by Pan, then in truth they give no other light but that described by the poet :

“ When wander travellers in woods by night,
By the moon’s doubtful and malignant light *.”

Again, it is a point of the sufficiency and perfection of the universe, that it has no offspring. By portions, indeed, it generates ; but how can it generate as a whole, when there is no body besides it ? And in respect to that wench, Iambe, the putative daughter of Pan, this addition to the fable is, in reality, full of knowledge ; for by her are signified those vain and empty opinions about the nature of things, which are constantly straying abroad, and filling every ear ; unprofitable in themselves, and supposititious somehow in their origin ; which are at times amusing by their prattle, but at other times troublesome and importunate.

* “ Quale per incertam Lunam sub luce maligna
Est iter in sylvis.”

EXAMPLE IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY.—OF WAR;
FROM THE FABLE OF PERSEUS.

PERSEUS, though he was an eastern, is said to have been sent by Pallas to cut off Medusa, who was the author of the greatest calamities to many nations of the west, in the remote parts of Iberia. For this monster, in many ways cruel and savage, was so pestilent and hideous, even to look upon, as merely by her aspect to convert men into stone. But Medusa was one of the Gorgons, and the only one of them who was mortal; the rest being invulnerable. Perseus, therefore, preparing himself for so great an enterprise, borrowed the arms and endowments of three divinities; wings from Mercury, (that is to say, for the feet, not the shoulders;) Pluto's helmet; and, lastly, the shield and mirror of Pallas. And yet, though furnished with so great equipment, he did not straightway proceed against Medusa; but first turned aside to the Grææ. These Grææ were sisters, by one parent, to the Gorgons, were grey-headed from their birth, and had the semblance of old women. They had one eye and one tooth, common to them all, and no more, which they carried in turn, as any of them had occasion to

go abroad, and were accustomed to lay down again when they came back. Accordingly, this eye and this tooth they lent to Perseus. And now, considering himself at last to be fully prepared for carrying through the intended enterprise, he hastened towards Medusa, courageous and flying. Though he found her asleep, however, he did not trust himself to look at her directly, lest she should awake ; but, turning away his head, and fixing his eye upon Pallas's glass, and in this manner directing his blow, he struck off Medusa's head. From the blood which thence flowed on the ground, forthwith sprung up a winged horse. But the head thus severed, Perseus transplanted, and set in the shield of Pallas, where it still retained its former virtue ; so that all who beheld it became stiff, like men amazed or planet-struck.

The fable seems to be imagined of conduct and skill in war. And, in the first place, every enterprise of war ought to be as it were a mission from Pallas ; not by any means from Venus, (as the war of Troy was,) or any other slight occasion ; since it is fit that the resolves concerning war should be founded in solid counsels. Next, as to choosing the kind of war, the fable proposes three very grave and wholesome directions. First, that there be not too great solicitude for the sub-

jugation of neighbouring countries; nor does the same rule apply to the increase of a private estate and that of a kingdom. For, in private possessions, the contiguity of ground is looked to; but, in the enlargement of an empire, opportunity, and the facility of achieving the war, and the advantages to result, are to be considered rather than vicinity. Accordingly, Perseus, though an eastern, by no means declined that so distant expedition, even to the remotest west. Of this there is a remarkable example, in the different methods of warfare pursued by two kings, father and son, namely, Philip and Alexander. For the first of these, occupied in wars with his neighbours, added but a few towns to his dominion; and that too, with the severest struggle, and greatest danger; seeing that on several occasions, and more particularly in the battle of Cherona, he was brought into extreme jeopardy. But Alexander, happily venturing on a distant expedition against the Persians, subdued numberless nations, more fatigued with his journeys than his battles. The same thing is still more manifest in the extension of their empire by the Romans; who, while their arms had as yet scarcely penetrated on the west beyond Liguria, embraced already, under their power and government, the provinces of the east, as far as Mount Taurus. Charles VIII. too,

King of France, who had made trial of the British war, (which was at length settled by marriage,) with indifferent success, accomplished that distant expedition to Naples with a kind of admirable ease and felicity. Distant wars have certainly this advantage at least, that the attack is made upon enemies who are no way accustomed to the tactics and arms of the invader; which is otherwise in the case of those who are bordering. Besides, the preparation itself, made for expeditions of this kind, is commonly more diligent and full; and the terror of the enemy greater from the very boldness and confidence of the attempt. Nor, again, in those distant expeditions, is it commonly in the power of the enemy, who are reached by so long a journey, to make a diversion or counter invasion; which, on the plan of warring with adjacent countries, is very frequently practised. But the capital matter is, that, in the subjugation of neighbours, the choice of opportunities is confined within narrow limit; but they who do not decline the more remote enterprise, can at their pleasure transfer the war to that place, where either the military discipline is chiefly relaxed, or the strength of the nation most reduced and wasted, or civil dissensions have opportunely arisen, or other such advantages offer.

The second point is, that the war stand upon some reason which is just, and pious, and honourable, and fair; for this gives alacrity both to the soldiers, and to the people contributing the charges; and opens and conciliates alliances; and, in short, is attended with manifold advantages. But, among the grounds of war, that one is exceedingly favourable which tends to the overthrowing of some tyranny, under which a nation sinks and lies prostrate, without spirit or strength, as under the gaze of Medusa; which also obtained immortality for Hercules. It was certainly held a sacred thing among the Romans, to fly with vigour and alacrity to the protection of their allies, when they were in any way oppressed. And their wars of just vengeance were almost always fortunate; as the war against Brutus and Cassius, to avenge the death of Cæsar; that of Severus, to avenge the death of Pertinax; of Junius Brutus, to avenge the death of Lucretia. In short, all who either lighten, or avenge, the calamities and wrongs of men, fight under Perseus.

The third precept is, that, in the undertaking of any war, there be a true calculation of the means, and that it be rightly weighed whether the war is such as may be accomplished, and brought to an end; so that there may not be a pursuit of vast and unlimited hopes. For, among the Gorgons, (by

whom are represented wars,) Perseus wisely made choice of her who was in her nature mortal ; not giving his mind to things impossible.

Such are the directions of the fable as to what should be deliberated at undertaking of a war. The rest pertains to the conduct of the war itself. And the things which are of most advantage in war are those three gifts of the gods ; which go near to command and subjugate fortune itself. For Perseus obtained expedition from Mercury ; secrecy of counsels from Orcus ; and caution from Pallas. Neither is it without an allegory, and that of the greatest knowledge, that those wings of speed, in the dispatch of affairs, (for celerity is of the greatest avail in war,) were *talares*, not *axillares*, attached to the feet, not the shoulders ; for celerity is not so necessary in the first onsets of a war, as in those which follow, and are succours to the first. And there is not a more frequent mistake than this in the conduct of war, that the prosecution of it and the after pushes correspond not to the briskness of the first movements. As to Pluto's helmet, (which had the power of rendering men invisible,) the allusion is manifest. For, next to celerity, the most important thing in war is secrecy in counsel ; of which celerity itself is in truth a great part. For celerity prevents the publishing of counsels. It

belongs to Pluto's helmet, that the direction of the war shall be committed to one person, with full powers: for consultation with many partakes of the crest of Mars, rather than the helmet of Pluto. Of the like import are the various pretexts, and doubtful intimations, and dispersed rumours, which either dazzle or turn aside men's eyes, and darken the truth of counsel. Those vigilant and jealous precautions likewise of letters, embassies, spies, and many other such, adorn and secure the helmet of Pluto. But it is of no less moment for a commander to explore the designs of the enemy, than to cover his own; therefore to Pluto's helmet is to be added the mirror of Pallas; by which are shown the things wherein the enemy is strong, and wherein defective, his concealed abettors, his factions and dissensions, his progress and his purposes. But, since, in the plans of war, so much must be hazarded of what is fortuitous, that no great trust is to be put either in concealment of our own counsels, or in discovering those of the adverse party, nor even in celerity itself; therefore it is, above all, necessary to take the shield of Pallas, that is to say, of foresight; so that as little may be left to fortune as possible. To this belong the approach by ways that are explored; the diligent fortifying of camps, (a thing nearly gone out of

use in modern warfare; but to the Romans a camp was like a fortified town, against the adverse issue of a battle;) a firm and well ordered line, not depending too much on light armed cohorts, or even on troops of horsemen; in short, all those things which respect a solid and careful defensive; for it is true that the shield of Pallas is of more avail in war, than even the sword of Mars.

But after being thus furnished with arms, and strengthened in spirit, there still remains to Perseus one thing more, of the greatest importance in every case, before the opening of a war; namely, that he step aside to the Grææ. The Grææ are Treacheries, being sisters to war; yet not german sisters, but inferior somehow in nobility of birth. For wars are generous, but treacheries degenerate and base. The description of these is elegant; that they are bald, and in a manner decrepid from their birth; on account of the perpetual anxieties and tremblings of the traitor. Their power, too, (before they break into open revolt,) is either in the eye or the tooth; since all faction, alienated from any government, and inclined to treachery, both pries and bites. And this eye and tooth are in a manner common. For, whatever they have learned and taken note of, is generally current, and passes among their hands from

one to another. And as for the tooth, they bite, as it were, with one mouth, and throw out the same calumnies ; so that if you hear one, you hear all. These Grææ, then, are to be conciliated by Perseus, and induced to give their help ; more especially to lend him their eye and tooth—the eye for discovery—the tooth for sowing rumours, and inflaming jealousies, and exciting men's minds.

When all matters have been thus well prepared and disposed for the war, then it is to be the first care, as Perseus contrived, that Medusa should be found sleeping. For he that undertakes a war prudently, seldom fails to find the enemy unprepared, and somewhat secure. Lastly, in the action itself, and onset of the war, comes into use that direction of looking into the mirror of Pallas. For many are able, before the actual danger, to examine narrowly and with attention the situation of the enemy ; while yet, in the very moment of peril, they are either melted with terror, or look at the danger straight forward, and with too much haste ; so that they rush inadvertently upon it, occupied with victory, careless of escape. Now, neither of these is fit ; and the glass of Pallas is to be looked into, with the head reverted; so that the attack may be rightly aimed, without either alarm or fury.

From a war finished and victorious, two effects follow. First, that birth and exsuscitation of Pegasus; plainly enough signifying Fame, which flies in every direction, celebrating the victory, and renders the residue of the war easy, and according to the wish. Secondly, the bearing of Medusa's head in the shield. And truly there is no kind of safeguard comparable to it in excellence. For one distinguished and memorable achievement, happily borne out and accomplished, renders every hostile movement abortive, and stupifies even malevolence itself.

EXAMPLE IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY.—OF THE PASSIONS; FROM THE FABLE OF DIONYSUS (OR BACCHUS.)

WE are told that Semele, Jupiter's mistress, after she had firmly bound him, by an irrevocable oath, to grant her request, whatever it might be, asked that he should come to her embraces in the same form as when he consorted with Juno; in the fulfilment of which, accordingly, she was burnt up by the lightning, and perished. But the infant which she carried in her womb, being taken

by the father, was by him sewed into his thigh, till the allotted months for the birth should be completed ; Jupiter somewhat halting, however, by the burthen which he thus bore. The boy, therefore, because he was a weight and pain to Jupiter, while carried in his thigh, received the name of Dionysus *. Being thus brought forth, he was nursed for some years by Proserpina. When he had grown up, his countenance appeared so womanish, that his sex might have been mistaken. He had also been dead and buried for a time ; but, not long after, returned to life. In the early part of his youth, he first discovered and taught the culture of the vine, and thereafter the preparation and use of wine ; and, having thus become celebrated and famous, he subdued the world, and reached to the farthest limit of Indus. He rode in a chariot drawn by tigers ; and certain misshapen demons, called the Cobali, Acratus, and others, danced round him : besides whom, the Muses also joined in his train. He married Ariadne, who had been deserted and left by Theseus. The tree consecrated to him was the ivy. He was likewise accounted the inventor of

* By this part of the explanation, in which the author does not follow the common etymologies of the word, he seems to derive it from δια, and νυσσω, or νυττω, *pungo*, *vello*, *stimulo*.

religious rites and ceremonies ; but of that kind which were not only fanatic, but full of corruptions and cruelty. He had the power, also, of inspiring with frantic rage ; and it is related that, during his orgies, two famous men, Pentheus and Orpheus, were torn in pieces by infuriated women ; the former, while, having ascended a tree, he sought, from curiosity, to become a spectator of what was going on ; the latter, while he was sweetly and skilfully striking the lyre. Lastly, the exploits of this god are scarcely to be distinguished from the actions of Jupiter.

The fable seems to have a connexion with morals ; and is such that scarcely any thing in that philosophy is to be found more excellent. For, under the character of Bacchus, is represented the nature of desire, or the affections and passions of the mind. And first, as to the birth of desire ; the origin of all desire, even the most hurtful, is nothing else but a seeming good ; for, as a real good is the mother of virtue, so an apparent good is the mother of desire. One is the lawful wife of Jupiter, (by whom is figured the human soul;) the other, his concubine, who, nevertheless, like Semele, is ambitious of Juno's honours. But desire is conceived through an unlawful wish, rashly granted, before it is properly understood and considered. And, after it begins to grow

warm, its mother, (that is to say, Nature and the seeming good,) is destroyed by the excessive fervency ; and perishes. Then the progress of desire from its conception is thus. It is both cherished and concealed by the human mind, (which is father to it,) especially in its lower part, as it were in the thigh ; and it stings, and tears, and weighs down the mind, so that its actions and resolves are hindered by it, and made to limp. Again, after it has, by habit and time, become strong, and breaks out into acts, as having, in a manner, fulfilled its months, and being now come forth openly, and born, still it is at first brought up, for some time, with Proserpina ; that is to say, it seeks a hiding-place, and remains private, and, as it were, under ground : till, laying aside the restraints of shame and fear, and confirmed in audaciousness, it either takes the pretext of some virtue, or becomes indifferent even to infamy. And it is most true, that every affection of great vehemence is of doubtful sex ; for it has a masculine impetuosity, but feminine impotence. That, too, is finely touched, of *Bacchus reviving from the dead*. For affections have sometimes the appearance of being set at rest, and extinct : but they are not to be trusted, no not in their grave ; for, let material and opportunity be supplied, and they rise again.

The discovery of the vine is an ingenious part of the fable. For every affection is highly inventive, and quick-scented, in the pursuit of those things which feed and cherish it. But, of all the things which have come to man's knowledge, wine has the greatest power, and is the most effectual, for exciting and inflaming passions of every kind ; and is, in a manner, the common fuel of all desires. It is with much elegance, too, that Bacchus is made the subduer of provinces, and the undertaker of an expedition without limit : for desire is never satisfied by what it has attained ; but, with endless and insatiable appetite, aims at something farther, and gapes after more. Even tigers herd with the passions ; and come at last to be yoked to their car. For, when appetite has begun to mount the chariot, and goes no longer on foot, and has now conquered reason, and leads her as it were in triumph, it is cruel, and untamed, and savage to all by whom it is resisted or opposed. There is wisdom, also, in that of the uncouth and ugly demons dancing round the chariot of Bacchus. For all the more violent passions produce, in the eyes, and even in the countenance and gesture, certain ungraceful and disordered motions, desultory and deformed ; so that one who, under some passion, of anger, for example, or haughtiness, or love, seems perhaps

to himself magnificent and glorious, may, to others, appear ridiculous and base. The Muses, too, are found in the train of desire ; for there is scarcely any passion so depraved, and low, as not to receive the blandishments of some art. And, in this, the forwardness and compliance of the learned derogates prodigiously from the dignity of the Muses ; who, instead of leaders and guides of life, as they ought to be, are not unfrequently the waiting women and panders of every passion.

That allegory, too, deserves special notice, how Bacchus lavished his affection on her who was cast off and despised by another. For it is most true, that affections court and pursue what experience has before rejected. And it will be found by all those who are indulgent to, and subserve, their passions, and who bid an unlimited price for possession, (whether their pursuit be honour, or love, or glory, or science, or whatever else,) that they follow things which have been deserted, and by great numbers, in almost every age, dismissed after trial, and turned away. Neither is it without a mystery, that the ivy was consecrated to Bacchus ; for this answers in a double sense. First, because the ivy continues green in winter ; secondly, because it embraces and clasps, and overtops so many things ; such as trees, and walls, and buildings. For, in respect to the

first, every desire does, through resistance, and prohibition, and by a sort of *antiperistasis*, acquire a freshness and vigour, (like ivy by the cold of winter.) Secondly, the affection, whatever it be, which predominates in the human mind, clings like the ivy, and confines all its actions and resolutions; so that you shall scarcely find any thing exempt, where its shoots are not fastened. Nor is it to be wondered, that superstitious rites are ascribed to Bacchus; since almost every vitiated affection riots in false religions; so that the heretic's kennel has exceeded the heathen's Bacchanalia, even those whose superstitions were not less bloody than degenerate. Nor, in like manner, is it wonderful, than Bacchus should be supposed the author of frenzy; since every passion, when excessive, is like a short fury; and, where it besets with particular vehemence, and grows habitual, often terminates in madness. The story, too, of Pentheus and Orpheus being torn during the orgies of Bacchus, contains a plain allegory; since there are two things against which all very strong affection is resentful and outrageous; one, the curiosity which inquires into it; and the other, a salutary and free admonition. Neither would it avail, though the inquiry so made should be for the sake of contemplating or beholding merely, without the

least malignity of purpose ; nor, again, though the admonition so given should be conveyed with much sweetness and skill ; for the orgies endure not, on any terms, either a Pentheus or an Orpheus. Lastly, that confusion of the persons of Jupiter and Bacchus is, without violence, convertible into an allegory ; since it is true, that lofty and famous achievements, and distinguished and glorious services, proceed sometimes from virtue, and right intention, and greatness of mind ; but, at other times, from a lurking affection, and concealed desire ; (though both may enjoy an equal celebrity of fame and praise ;) so that it shall not be easy to distinguish the exploits of Bacchus from the actions of Jupiter.

ANTITHETA RERUM.

De Augm. Scient. lib. vi. c. 3.

COMMON PLACES, OR TOPICS ARGUED ON
BOTH SIDES.

EXAMPLES OF RHETORICAL COMMON PLACES*.

1. NOBILITY.

For.—THOSE who have virtue deeply planted in the stock, are no longer merely indisposed to vice, but incapable of it.

Nobility is the laurel with which men are crowned by time.

* This subject is introduced by the author, in his Advancement of Learning, Book II. as follows : “ Secondly, I do resume also that which I mentioned before, touching provision or preparatory store, for the furniture of speech and readiness of invention, which appeareth to be of two sorts ; the one in resemblance to a shop of pieces unmade up ; the other to a shop of things ready made up, both to be applied to that which is frequent and most in request ;

We revere antiquity in lifeless monuments ;
how much rather in the living ?

If you despise nobility of family, what difference will be left between the human offspring and the brutes ?

the former of these things I will call *Antitheta*, and the latter *Formulae*.

“ *Antitheta* are theses argued *pro et contra*, wherein men may be more large and laborious ; but (in such as are able to do it) to avoid prolixity of entry, I wish the seeds of the several arguments to be cast up into some brief and acute sentences, not to be cited, but to be as scanes or bottoms of thread to be unwinded at large when they come to be used, supplying examples and authorities by reference.

“ *Pro verbis legis.*

“ *Non est interpretatio sed divinatio qua recedit a litera.*

“ *Cum receditur a litera, judex transit in legislatorem.*

“ *Pro sententia legis.*

“ *Ex omnibus verbis est eliciendus sensus, qui interpretatur singula.*

“ *Formulae* are but decent and apt passages or conveniences of speech, which may serve indifferently for different subjects ; as of preface, conclusion, digression, transition, excusation, &c. For, as in buildings, there is a great pleasure and use in the well-casting of the stair-cases, entries, doors, windows, and the like ; so, in speech, the conveyances and passages are of special ornament and effect *.”

* This subject, respecting what Bacon here distinguishes by the term *formulae*, is not farther pursued, either in the “ *Advancement of Learning*,” or in the Treatise “ *De Augm Scient.*”

Nobility skreenst virtue from envy, and commends it to favour.

Against.—Seldom is nobility from virtue ; virtue from nobility seldomer.

In the subsequent work, “ *De Augmentis Scientiarum*,” from which the present fragment is translated, the preliminary observations may be rendered as follows :

The Second Collection, which pertains to a provision or store, and is yet wanting, is that which Cicero, (as we have before said under the head of Logic,) points at, when he directs that there should be kept in readiness certain common places, argued and handled on both sides ; *ex gr.* *pro verbis legis, et pro sententia legis, &c.* But we extend this direction to other things likewise, applying it not only to the judicial, but to the deliberative, and demonstrative also. And it is most desirable that all the topics of which there is general use, (whether they have respect to proofs and refutations, or to persuasives and dissuasives, or to praises and vituperations,) should be kept at hand, and already studied ; and that these should, with all the force of the mind, and as it were desperately, and quite beyond the real bounds, be pushed to the extreme of exaltation and depression. As to the manner of such a collection, both for use and brevity, we hold it best that such *loci* should be contracted into certain pointed and brief sentences, as into so many clues ; which may be wound off into a more lengthened discourse, when occasion requires. And some preparative of this sort we find in Seneca, but only in hypotheses and cases. Having many such prepared, we think it good to propose some by way of example. These we call *Antitheta Rerum*, or topics argued on both sides.

Nobles oftener plead their ancestors for excuse, than employ them for advancement.

The industry of the new men is commonly such, as to make the nobles appear statues.

Nobles are bad runners in the course ; they look too often behind.

2. BEAUTY.

For.—The deformed commonly avenge themselves on nature.

Virtue is no other but an inward beauty ; and beauty no other but an outward virtue.

The deformed would deliver themselves from contempt, even through a despite of themselves.

Beauty makes virtues shine, but vices blush.

Against.—Virtue, like a rich jewel, is best set without much gold and ornament.

As a gorgeous dress to a misshapen person, so is beauty to a wicked one.

They whom beauty enhances, and whom it moves, are for the most part equally shallow.

3. YOUTH.

For.—First thoughts, and the counsels of the young, have most of inspiration.

Old men are wise for themselves, more than for others and the commonwealth.

If it might be seen, age deforms the mind more than the body.

Old men fear every thing but heaven.

Against.—Youth is the field of repentance.

There is in youth an inborn contempt of the authority of age; so that every one is wise at his own expense.

Time does not ratify the counsels to which he is not called.

In age, the loves are changed into the graces.

4. HEALTH.

For.—Care of health debases the mind, and makes it suitor to the body.

In a sound body, the soul is a guest; in a sickly one, a prisoner.

Nothing so much advances the ends of action as favourable health; but sickness keeps too much holiday.

Against.—Often to grow well, is often to grow young.

Excuse of sickness is sovereign; even the sound have recourse to it.

Health joins soul and body in too strict a league.

Great kingdoms have been governed from a bed, and great armies from a letter.

5. WIFE AND CHILDREN.

For.—Love of country begins at family.

Wife and children are a discipline of humanity ; but the single are rugged and morose.

Want of wife and children are helps to nothing but flight.

He who does not beget children sacrifices to death.

They who are happy in other things, are commonly unfortunate in offspring ; lest the human state should come too near the divine.

Against.—He who has married, and got children, has given hostages to fortune.

Generation and children are human ; creation and works are divine.

Progeny are the perpetuity of brutes ; good deeds and institutions the memorials of men.

Family respects commonly subvert public.

Some are content to have Priam's fortune, who survived all his house.

6 RICHES.

For.—They despise riches, who despair of them.

Through envy of riches, virtue has been deified.

While philosophers are debating whether virtue or pleasure be all, do you collect the instruments of both.

It is by riches that virtue is turned to the general good.

Other gifts command a province ; money alone commands all.

Against.—Of great wealth men have either the custody, or the distribution, or the repute ; but not the enjoyment.

You may see false prices put on stones and other toys ; that a use may be found for great wealth.

Many, who counted to buy every thing with their treasures, have themselves been bought the first.

I would call riches no other than the baggage of virtue ; for they are both necessary to it, and a hindrance.

Money is a good servant, but the worst master.

7. HONOURS.

For.—Honours are the counters, not of tyrants, (as they say,) but of divine providence.

Honours make both virtues and vices conspicuous ; so that they are a spur to the one, and a bridle to the other.

One cannot tell how he advances in the course of virtue, till preferment gives him a field in which to run

The motion of virtue, as of other things, is violent to its place, and tranquil in its place; but the place of virtue is honour.

Against.—While we seek honour we lose liberty.

Honours give us the command of those things chiefly, which it is best if we do not desire, and next best if we cannot obtain.

The ascent of honour is steep, the height slippery, and the fall headlong.

They who are in honour have need to borrow opinion from the vulgar, to believe their own happiness.

8. DOMINION.

For.—Possession of happiness is a great good; but power of imparting it to others is a still greater.

Kings are not like men, but like planets; for they have a great influence both on individuals, and on times themselves.

To resist those who are the vicegerents of God, is not treason merely, but a warring against heaven.

Against.—How wretched, when there is almost nothing that you desire, and nearly every thing that you fear.

They who are in power are like the celestial bodies ; which have much veneration, but no rest.

None of mortal condition is admitted to the table of the gods, except it be for sport.

9. PRAISE—REPUTATION.

For.—Praises are the beams of virtue reflected.

Praise is that part of honour which men attain by free suffrages.

Honours are conferred by the several governments ; but praises are every where free.

In the voice of the people there is something divine ; for how otherwise should so many heads conspire together ?

Wonder not if the common sort speak with greater truth than the more honourable ; for they speak also with greater security.

Against.—Report is a worse judge than messenger.

What has a good man to do with the breath of a mob ?

Fame is like a river ; it bears up light things, and drowns the solid.

The lowest virtues are extolled by the vulgar; the middling they wonder at; of the highest they have no understanding.

Praise is rather from ostentation than desert; and follows what is empty, more than what is real.

10. NATURE.

For.—The progress of custom is arithmetical, that of nature geometrical.

Nature has the same respect to custom, in individuals, which, in nations, the common law has to particular customs.

A custom contrary to nature is a sort of tyranny; and falls to the ground suddenly, and on a slight occasion.

Against—We think according to nature, and speak according to rule; but we act according to custom.

Nature is a kind of schoolmaster; custom is a magistrate.

11. FORTUNE.

For.—Known virtues obtain praise, hidden ones success.

The virtues of duty get praise, those of talent success.

Fortune is like the galaxy, a cluster of many obscure virtues that are nameless.

Fortune is at least to be honoured for her children ; namely, confidence and authority.

Against.—The folly of one is the fortune of another.

What I would commend in fortune is this, that as she does not choose, she does not keep.

Great men have been found among the worshippers of fortune, in order to decline the envy of their virtues.

12. LIFE.

For.—It is absurd, that the things which are accidental to life should be desired more than life itself.

A long course is better than a short one for every thing, even for virtue.

Without some length of life, we can neither accomplish labour, nor knowledge, nor repentance.

Against.—The philosophers, by such apparatus and provision against death, have only made it the more terrible.

Death is a terror to men, because it is unknown ; as darkness is to children.

There is not to be found among men a passion

so weak, that it may not, when a little vehement and intense, master the fear of death.

A man may be willing to die, not only because he is valiant, or because he is wretched, or because he is wise, but simply because he is weary.

13. SUPERSTITION.

For.—They who offend by zeal, though they are not to be approved, are, nevertheless, to be loved.

Moderation is befitting in things human, but extremes in those which are divine.

A superstitious man is a religious man elect.

I would sooner believe all the fabulous prodigies of whatever religion you will, than that this universe is without God.

Against.—As an ape is more ugly by its likeness to man, so is superstition by its likeness to religion.

As the hatefulness of affectation in things civil, such is that of superstition in things divine.

It is better to have no thought of heaven, than to think unworthily.

The ancient commonwealths were disturbed, not by the school of Epicurus, but the porch.

To be simply an atheist in opinion, enters not into the human mind; but great hypocrites are

the true atheists, who have a perpetual handling of things holy, but no reverence.

14. PRIDE.

For.—Pride keeps a distance even from vice; and, as poison is expelled by poison, so not a few vices are expelled by pride.

An easy man is a prey even to the vices of others; a proud man only to his own.

Pride, ascending from contempt of others to contempt of self, will at last be true wisdom.

Against.—Pride is the envy which kills all virtue and worth.

Other vices are merely in opposition to virtues; pride alone is contagious to them.

In pride, the better part of vice is wanting; namely, concealment.

The proud man, in his disregard of others, also forgets himself.

15. INGRATITUDE.

For.—Men are accused of being ungrateful, when they are only too shrewd in discerning the motives of the benefactor.

While we would be grateful to a certain number, we deprive others of justice, and ourselves of liberty.

The obligation of a good deed is the less binding, that the price is not agreed.

Against.—The crime of ingratitude is not corrected by punishment, but left to the furies.

The bonds of kindness are closer than the bonds of duty; so that he who is ungrateful is likewise unjust, and every thing.

Such is man's condition; no one is so much born for the public, but that he is debtor, every way, both to private favour, and vengeance.

16. ENVY.

For.—It is natural to hate that which upbraids our own fortunes.

In the commonwealth, envy is like a salutary ostracism.

Against.—Envy keeps no holidays.

There is nothing that can reconcile envy and virtue, but death.

Envy imposes on virtue such labours as Juno did on Hercules.

17. IMMODOESTY.

For.—It is owing to jealousy, that chasteness becomes a virtue.

There must needs be much sadness, where love can be accounted a serious matter.

Why place among the virtues, either an observance of diet, or a form of cleanliness, or a daughter of pride ?

Of love, as of wild fowl, there is no property ; but the right passes with the possession.

Against.—Immodesty is the worst of Circe's transformations.

The immodest man has lost all reverence for himself ; namely, the curb to every vice.

All who, like Paris, make election of beauty, forfeit, like him, wisdom and power.

Alexander lighted on no vulgar truth, when he called sleep and lust the signs of mortality.

18. CRUELTY.

For.—None of the virtues is so chargeable with guilt as clemency.

Cruelty, if it arises from vengeance, is justice ; if from danger, prudence.

He who grants mercy to an enemy denies it to himself.

Bloodletting is not oftener necessary in medicine, than slaughter in civil estate.

Against.—To proceed by massacre, is the part of a wild beast, or a fury.

A good man ever looks upon cruelty as something fabulous, and a fiction of tragedy.

19. VAIN GLORY.

For.—He who seeks praise to himself, seeks, at the same time, things useful to others.

He who is so sober-minded as to care for nothing foreign, may chance to think the public foreign too.

Minds in which there is something of vacancy, more easily entertain a concern for the commonwealth.

Against.—Vain-glorious men are ever factious, liars, inconstant, and out of measure.

The Braggart is a prey to the Shark.

It is a base thing to be an importunate suitor to a handmaid ; but praise is the handmaid of virtue.

20. JUSTICE.

For.—Empires and governments are only helps to justice ; for, if justice might be otherwise upheld, there would be no need of these.

It is owing to justice that man is to man as a god, and not a wolf.

Justice, though it has not power to abolish vices, can prevent them from being hurtful.

Against.—If to be just is, not to do to another what you would not have done to you, then mercy is justice.

If each is to have his own, humanity is surely to have indulgence.

Why do you speak to me of equity, when to the wise all things are unequal?

Consider what was the condition of criminals in Rome; and allow that justice is not the virtue of a republic.

This common justice of states is like a philosopher in the court; it only helps to win reverence for authority.

21. FORTITUDE.

For.—There is nothing to be feared but fear itself.

There is nothing either solid in pleasure, or secure in virtue, where fear molests.

He who looks upon danger with open eyes, to encounter it, takes note likewise how to shun it.

Other virtues deliver us from the dominion of vice; courage alone from the dominion of fortune.

Against.—It is a goodly virtue, which seeks destruction in order to destroy.

It is a brave virtue, which even drunkenness produces.

He that is prodigal of his own life, will not be scrupulous of another's.

Fortitude is a virtue of the iron age.

22. TEMPERANCE.

For.—The power is nearly the same, of abstaining, and sustaining.

Uniformities, concords, and measures of movement, are heavenly things ; and characters of eternity.

Temperance, like a healthful cold, braces and invigorates the powers of the mind.

The delicate and roving sense has need of narcotics ; and so it is with affection.

Against.—These negative virtues please not ; for they are harmless only, but have no desert.

Where there is no excess, the mind languishes.

I like virtues which bring excellency of action, not sluggishness of passion.

When you reckon the concordant movements of the mind, you will reckon few ; for it is a poor man who can count his flock.

These, (of not using, that you may not desire, and not desiring that you may not fear,) belong to the pusillanimous and fearful.

23. CONSTANCY.

For.—Constancy is the ground-work of the virtues.

He is miserable, who knows not what himself is next to be.

If the weakness of human judgment may not consist with things as they are ; let it be at least consistent with itself.

Constancy communicates a grace even to vices.

If, to inconstancy of fortune, be added inconstancy of purpose too, how blind is the life !

Fortune, like Proteus, if you persevere, comes back to her shape.

Against.—Constancy, like a churlish porter, drives away many messengers of good.

It is fit that constancy should bear adverse fortune well ; for she somehow invites it.

The shortest folly is the best.

24. MAGNANIMITY.

For.—If the mind has once devised generous ends, immediately not virtues only are in attendance, but divine helps also.

Virtues, if from habit or training, are of the herd ; if from purpose, heroical.

Against.—Magnanimity is a poetical virtue.

25. KNOWLEDGE.—CONTEMPLATION.

For.—That is a real pleasure, and according to nature, in which there is no satiety.

It is the sweetest view, to look down upon the mistakes of others.

How good it is to have the orbits of the mind concentric with the universe !

All evil affections are false computations ; for goodness and truth are one.

Against.—Contemplation is a specious idleness.

To think well is little better than to dream well.

Leave the world to heaven ; care thou for thy country.

A politician even sows contemplations.

26. LETTERS.

For.—If books were to be written about trivial matters, there would scarcely be any need of experience.

In reading, we keep company with the wise ; in action, oftener with fools.

Those sciences are not to be counted useless, which have not of themselves any use ; if they sharpen and clear men's wits.

Against.—In the academies men learn to take on trust.

What art ever taught the ready use of art ?

To be wise by rule, and by experience, are methods directly opposite ; so that he who is used to the one is unapt for the other.

Art is in most cases employed foolishly ; that it may not be unemployed.

It is almost universal with schoolmen, that they are used, in every matter, to put forth that which they know, rather than proceed to learn that which they know not.

27. READINESS.

For.—The wisdom which is not prompt is not seasonable.

He who is quick to err is quick to amend his error.

He who is wise on forethought, but not on the occasion, does nothing great.

Against.—The wisdom which is at hand is not deep-fetched.

Wisdom is like dress ; what is for dispatch is light.

His wisdom is not ripened by age, whose counsels are not ripened by deliberation.

Things devised for a short time please for a short time.

28. SECRECY IN COUNCIL.

For.—Nothing is concealed from the silent man ; because every thing is imparted to him with safety.

He who readily speaks what he knows, speaks also what he knows not.

To the secret even mysteries are due.

Against.—Changing manners best hide the mind.

Taciturnity is the virtue of a confessor.

Every thing is withheld from the taciturn; because they only repay with silence.

The close man is next to the unknown.

29. FACILITY.

For.—I love the man who is open to affections of others; but who will not surrender his judgment from obsequiousness.

To be flexible is to come nearest the nature of gold.

Against.—Facility is little else than a foolish privation of judgment.

The favours of facile men have the appearance of debts; their refusals, of injuries.

He who procures any thing from a facile man, is indebted to himself.

The facile man is pressed by all difficulties; for he entangles himself in all.

The facile man can scarcely make an excuse without shame.

30. POPULARITY.

For.—The same things commonly please the wise; but, to meet the inconstancy of fools, is a part of wisdom.

To study the people is to be studied.

Men who are themselves great, have scarce any one to fear but the people.

Against.—He who assorts much with fools may himself be suspected.

He who pleases the mob commonly makes the mob.

Nothing moderate ever pleases the multitude.

The lowest flattery is the flattery of the crowd.

31. LOQUACITY.

For.—The silent man is suspicious, either of others, or of himself.

All constraint is unhappy; that of silence is the most miserable.

Silence is the virtue of fools; and it was rightly said to a silent man, If you be wise you are a fool, if you be a fool you are wise.

Silence, like night, is convenient for ambush.

The flowing thoughts are the most wholesome.

Silence is a kind of solitude.

He who is silent is a slave to repute.

Silence neither expels evil thoughts, nor distributes good.

Against.—Silence adds to words both grace and authority.

Silence, like a sort of sleep, nurses wisdom.

Silence ferments thought.

Silence is the style of wisdom.

Silence woos the truth.

32. DISSIMULATION.

For.—Dissimulation is a compendious wisdom.

We ought to be uniform, not in what we say, but in what we intend.

Even in the mind, nakedness is unseemly.

Dissimulation is both an ornament and a protection.

Dissimulation is the hedge of counsel.

Some are deceived to their good.

He who does all without disguise, deceives not the less; for the greatest number either do not apprehend, or do not believe.

Openness of mind is nothing but weakness of mind.

Against.—Though we cannot think agreeably to the truth of things, yet let us speak agreeably to what we think.

They who have not capacity for the arts of life, will take dissimulation for wisdom.

He who dissembles, throws away the chief instrument of action ; namely, confidence.

Dissimulation invites dissimulation.

He who dissembles is not free.

33. BOLDNESS.

For.—The bashful man invites blame.

What action is to the orator, boldness is to the man of affairs ; first, second, third.

I like the shame which confesses, but hate that which accuses.

Confidence of manners brings minds more quickly together.

The close countenance, and open speech, are best.

Against.—Boldness is pursuivant to folly.

Impudence is profitable for nothing but imposture.

Confidence is the director of fools, and the buffoon of wise men.

Boldness is a stupor of the sense, with a vice of the will.

34. CEREMONIES.—POINTS.—AFFECTION.

For.—A graceful government of the countenance and gesture is the true seasoning of virtue.

If we comply with the multitude even in speech, why not in dress and gait ?

He who observes not a decorum in slight things, and of daily custom, may be a great man indeed ; but you shall know him to be a wise one at times only.

Virtue and wisdom, without ceremony, and observance, speak as it were a foreign tongue ; the many do not understand them.

He who has not learnt the judgment of the vulgar, by a conformity with them, and at the same time knows it not by observation, is of all men the most foolish.

Points of behaviour are a translation of virtue into the mother tongue.

Against.—What can be more unseemly, than to carry the theatre into life ?

What is decent is ingenuous ; what comes from art is odious.

It is better to have painted cheeks and plaited hair, than painted and plaited manners.

He who gives his mind to such minute observations is incapable of great thoughts.

An affectation of ingenuousness is a light from rottenness.

35. JESTS.

For.—A jest is the orator's altar.

He who seasons every thing with good-natured mirth, retains the freedom of his mind.

It is a politic thing, above what men suppose, to pass easily from jest to earnest, and from earnest to jest.

A truth, which might not come home otherwise, is often carried by a jest.

Against.—Who does not despise these hunters after monsters and conceits?

To take from the real worth of things by a jest, is a dishonest trick.

That wit is the best which raises no laugh.

These facetious men seldom go beyond the surface of things, where jests are seated.

When a jest has any effect on serious business, then levity is childish.

36. LOVE.

For.—Do we not observe that all seek themselves? but only the lover finds himself.

There is no better frame of the mind, than under the rule of some distinguished affection.

A wise man seeks some object of passion; for, to him who has not some strong desire, all things are insipid and full of weariness.

What shall one delight in, if not in one?

Against.—The stage is much beholden to love; but life not at all.

Nothing is so uncertain in character as love; for it is either so foolish a thing as to be ignorant of

itself, or so base a thing as to daub and disguise itself.

I hate those who can love but one thing.

Love is a very narrow contemplation.

37. FRIENDSHIP.

For.—Friendship effects the same as fortitude, but more agreeably.

Friendship is a pleasant seasoning of all our possessions.

It is the worst solitude, to have no true friendships.

Loss of friendships is a just punishment for infidelity.

Against.—He who contracts close friendships imposes new bonds on himself.

It is the part of a weak mind to share fortune.

38. FLATTERY.

For.—Flattery is rather from custom than from ill design.

To instruct by praise, was ever a deference due to the powerful.

Against.—Flattery is the style of slaves.

Flattery is the varnish of vice.

Flattery is the manner of bird-catching, by imitation of the note.

Flattery is comic by its deformity, but tragic by its mischief.

Medicine for the ears is of all things the most difficult.

39. REVENGE.

For.—Private vengeance is a homely justice.

He who repays violence, wrongs the laws merely, not the man.

Dread of private vengeance is useful; for the laws too often sleep.

Against.—He who did the wrong gave rise to the evil; he who returned it took away the limit.

Vengeance, the more it is natural, is on that account the more to be restrained.

He who readily returns an injury, was perhaps the last in time only, not in purpose

40. INNOVATION.

For.—All remedy is innovation.

He who shuns new remedies, stays for new ills.

The greatest innovator is time; why then not imitate time?

Remote examples are not to the purpose; the recent are corrupt, and fawning.

Leave it to the unskilful and contentious, to govern things by precedents.

As they who bring nobility into their family, are commonly of greater worth than those who come after them ; so the reformations of things are better, for the most part, than what is done according to examples.

The stubborn retention of customs is a no less turbulent thing than innovation.

Since things decline of themselves to the worse, unless they are advisedly changed to the better, how will the evil have an end ?

The slaves of custom are the laughing stocks of time.

Against.—New births are unsightly.

We like no author but time.

There is no innovation without injury ; for it tears asunder the present things.

Things established in practice, if not good, at least sort well together.

What reformer imitates time, which innovates so softly as to escape the sense ?

What happens unexpectedly, is the less welcome to him whom it benefits ; and more disagreeable to him whom it hurts.

41. DELAY.

For.—Fortune sells many things to the hasty, which she gifts to the slow.

While we hurry to embrace the beginnings,
we grasp at shadows.

We are to attend while things balance, and to
act when they turn.

Let the beginnings of actions be committed to
Argus, the ends to Briareus.

Against.—Opportunity presents at first the
handle of the vessel, and afterwards the belly.

Opportunity, like the Sibyl, lessens the offer,
and increases the price.

Celerity is the helmet of Pluto.

What is done early is done by choice; what
is done late is extorted.

42. PREPARATION.

For.—He who, with little preparation, under-
takes a great matter, begets an occasion for hope.

By slender provision, we purchase not fortune,
but wisdom.

Against.—The best term for preparation is
the first opportunity for action.

Let no one hope that he can bind fortune by
apparatus.

The mixture of preparation and action is po-
litical; the separation is empty and unfortunate.

Great preparation is a waster both of time and
business.

43. WITHSTAND THE BEGINNINGS.

For.—Dangers oftener beguile than overcome.

It is easier to apply a remedy to the danger, than to watch and guard its progress.

Danger is no longer trivial if it appears trivial.

Against.—He who girds himself, invites the danger to come on ; and insures the peril by the remedy.

Even in the guarding against a danger, lesser dangers exist.

It is better to deal with a few perils which have come to head, than with the threatenings of every one.

44. VIOLENT COUNSELS.

For.—To such as embrace that tame sort of prudence, an increase of the evil is salutary.

The necessity which dictates violent counsels, also accomplishes them.

Against.—Every violent remedy is big with new mischief.

None give violent counsels, but anger and fear.

45. SUSPICION.

For.—The sinews of prudence are distrust ; but suspicion is an ointment for the bones.

That honesty may well be suspected, which suspicion shakes.

Suspicion weakens the frail honesty, but knits the strong.

Against.—Suspicion absolves trust.

Unbridled suspicion is a kind of civil fury.

46. THE LETTER OF THE LAW.

For.—That which forsakes the letter is not interpretation, but divination.

When the letter is left, the judge becomes a legislator.

Against.—The sense is to be drawn from the whole words, and to interpret each.

The worst tyranny is torture of the law.

47. FOR TESTIMONY AGAINST ARGUMENT.

For.—He who rests on argument, pronounces, not according to the cause, but the orator.

He who believes argument, rather than testimony, should, in like manner, believe his wit rather than his sense.

It would be safe to trust reasoning, if men never acted absurdly.

Arguments, when opposed to testimony, make a thing appear wonderful, but not appear true.

Against.—If witnesses are to be believed against reasoning, it is enough for a judge merely not to be deaf.

Argument is an antidote against the poison of testimony.

It is safest to believe those proofs which seldomest lie.

MEDITATIONES SACRAE.

I

SACRED MEDITATIONS.

OF THE WORKS OF GOD AND THE WORKS OF MAN.

God looked upon all things which his hands had made, and they were very good; but man, turning to look upon the works which his hands had made, found that they were all vanity and vexation of spirit.

IF, therefore, thou wilt work the works of God, thy sweat shall be as fragrant ointment, and thy rest as the Sabbath of God. Thou shalt labour in the sweat of a good conscience; and thou shalt sit down in the repose of sweetest contemplation.

But if thou wilt follow after human greatness, thou shalt have, in thy toil, perplexity and sting; and, in thy recollection, loathing and reproach. And it happens to thee, O man, according to thy desert; that when thou, who art the work of God, turnest not to him in well pleasing, thy works, too, render unto thee like fruit of bitterness.

OF THE SAVIOUR'S MIRACLES.

He did all things well.

It is the true laud. God, when he created the universe, saw that each and every thing was very good. God, the Word, in the miracles which he showed forth, (for every miracle is a new creation, and not according to the law of the first creation,) willed to do nothing which should not breathe wholly of grace and goodness. Moses performed many miracles, and routed the Egyptians by sundry plagues: Elias performed them, and shut up the heavens that it should not rain upon the land, and again drew down from heaven the fire of God upon the leaders and the cohorts: Elisha performed them, and called forth the she-bears from the forest to tear in pieces the children: Peter struck Ananias, the sacrilegious hypocrite, to death; and Paul struck Elymas, the sorcerer,

with blindness. But Jesus did none of these things: The spirit descended upon him in the likeness of a dove; concerning which, he said, *Ye know not what spirit ye are of:* The spirit of Jesus was a dove-like spirit. Those servants of God were as the oxen of God, treading out the wheat, and trampling the chaff; but Jesus was the Lamb of God, without anger, and condemnation. All his miracles concerned the body of man; and his doctrines the soul of man. Man's body has need of aliment, of outward defence, and of medicine. He gathered the multitude of fishes in the nets, that he might provide the more abundant food for men: He changed the aliment of water into the worthier aliment of wine, for exhilarating the heart of man: He gave order that the fig-tree, which performed not the office to which it was destined, namely, of furnishing fruit to man, should be withered: He enlarged the pittance of fishes and loaves, for feeding the multitude of people: He chid the winds which threatened them who sailed: He restored motion to the lame, light to the blind, speech to the dumb, health to the sick, clean flesh to the lepers, soundness of mind to the demoniacs, life to the dead. No miracle of judgment; all of beneficence, and regarding man's body; for, in respect to riches,

he did not condescend to show forth any miracle, save that one for payment of tribute to Cæsar.

OF THE INNOCENCY OF THE DOVE, AND PRUDENCE OF THE SERPENT.

Non accipit stultus verba prudentiae, nisi ea dixeris quæ versantur in corde ejus.

To the depraved and corrupt judgment of man, all instruction and persuasives that are offered prove ineffectual, and are despised, which begin not with the detection and representation of the disease of mind to be healed; in the same way that medicine is unprofitably employed, where the sickness is not first understood. For evil-minded men, whose thoughts are all unsound, have this prepossession, that they look upon goodness to come of simplicity or weakness of character, and an unskilfulness in human affairs. Accordingly, unless they plainly perceive, that the things dwelling in their hearts, that is to say, the most inward lurkings of their malice, are thoroughly seen into by him who purposes to persuade them, they hold the words of wisdom in contempt. By him, therefore, who aspires after goodness, not solitary and individual, but that fruitful and generative

goodness which may win others, those *depths of Satan* should be fully known; so that he may speak with weight, and with a true persuasion. Hence the precept, *Prove all things, hold fast that which is good*; drawing forth a just election out of a general experience. From the same fountain flows that other; *Be ye wise as serpents, but harmless as doves.* It is not the serpent's tooth, nor his poison, nor his sting; for these are not to be received. Nor let there be a dread of pollution; for the sun looks upon corruption, yet is not any way polluted. Neither let any think, that by this he is tempting God; for he has the declaration, *God is able to keep you blameless.*

OF THE EXALTATION OF CHARITY.

If I rejoiced at the destruction of him that hated me, or lifted up myself when evil found him.

The imprecation of Job. To return the love of friends, is the charity of publicans, from the compact of advantage; but to be well minded towards enemies, is among the heights of the Christian law, and an imitation of the godhead. But, again, in such charity, there are many degrees:

of which, the first is, to pardon enemies who turn to us repenting ; and of this charity some shadow and likeness is found even among the brutes that are generous ; for lions are reported to be no longer savage against the subdued and prostrate. A second degree is to pardon enemies though they be inexorable, and without the atonements of reconciliation. A third degree is, not only to dispense pardon and forgiveness to enemies, but also to confer upon them services and good deeds. Yet still these various degrees have, or may have, I know not what of ostentation ; or at least of magnanimity ; more than of pure charity. For, if one is sensible, as in these cases, that a virtue goes forth and flows from him, it may be that he is magnified, and takes pleasure more in the product of his own virtue, than in the safety and good of his neighbour. But, if some evil happens to thine enemy from another quarter, and thou, in the secretest chambers of thy heart, art thereby laden and distrest, and hast no joy in this, that the day of thy vengeance and retribution has arrived ; this I consider to be the summit and exaltation of charity.

OF THE MEASURE OF CARES.

Sufficient for the day is the evil thereof.

It is fit there should be a limit to human cares ; otherwise they are unprofitable, by oppressing the mind and confounding the reason ; and profane, as savouring of a spirit which promises to itself a sort of perpetuity in the things of the world. For we ought to be of to-day, on account of the shortness of life; and not of to-morrow ; but *using*, as some one has said, *the present things, for the future will be present in their turn* ; so that the care of present things is enough. Moderate cares, indeed, whether they be of family, or of the public, or of things entrusted, are not stigmatized. But the excess is twofold. First, when we extend the series or succession of our cares to an over-length and remoteness of time ; as if by our preparation we could bind down the Divine Providence ; which, even among the heathen, was ever held as ill-fated and presumptuous. For it was commonly received, that those who attributed much to fortune, and were awake and ready for present opportunities, were eminently successful. But such as seemed of a deeper prudence and design, and who trusted that they

had well considered and provided for all things, were unfortunate. The second excess in our cares is, where we delay longer than is fit making our complete deliberation, and coming to a resolve. For, who is there amongst us, capable of using so great a care as may fully suffice to extricate him, or even to determine that he cannot be extricated ; and who does not often reconsider the same things, and unprofitably tread in the same round of thoughts, and, after all, is cast away ? Now, cares of this sort are most adverse to purposes, both earthly and divine.

OF EARTHLY HOPE.

Better is the sight of the eyes than the wandering of the desire.

Natural sense, directed to its several objects, puts the mind in better condition and government, than such imaginations and reaches of thought. For it is the nature of the human mind, even in the gravest dispositions, that it straight goes on from sense of particulars, and springs forward, and augurs of every thing else, that they will be conformable and corresponding to those which strike upon the present observation. If it be a

sense of good, it is prone to unbounded hope ; if it be a sense of evil, to fear. Hence, the saying, that *good hopes are not always sure auguries* ; and the contrary, that *doubting is the worst augury*. And yet there is some advantage in fear ; for it sharpens industry, and prepares for suffering.

None of these threatened toils, O sacred maid,
Are new to me, or unexpected fall ;
I saw before, and inly conned them all *.

Hope, on the other hand, seems to be something unprofitable. And to what does this anticipation of good tend ? For, observe, if the good turns out to be less than you hoped, even though it be a good, yet because it is less, it seems to be a loss rather than a gain, by the excess of the hope. If it turns out the same, and exactly as much, it is stale, and more nearly allied to weariness. If the success be greater than the hope, here indeed there appears to be something gained ; but would it not have been better to have gained the sum at once, without the hope, than to have drawn an interest of lesser hope ? And

* “ Non ulla laborum,
O virgo, nova mi facies inopinave surgit ;
Omnia praecepi, atque animo mecum ante peregi.”

such is the course of hope in prosperity ; but, in adversity, it nearly melts down the real strength of the mind. For neither are there at all times materials for hope ; and, by any failure, however small, in our hopes, the whole firmness of the mind is apt to give way, and the spirit to degenerate and sink ; since we thus meet our misfortunes under a sort of alienation and wandering of the mind, not with fortitude and resolution. It is, therefore, a light fiction of the poets, that hope is the antidote of human ills, and assuagement of our pains ; for, in truth, it rather inflames and exasperates them, by the multiplying and refreshing of them. Yet we see, notwithstanding, how most men give themselves altogether up to these devices of hope, and anticipations of the mind ; and how, without remembrance of the past, and scarcely considering the present, they are always young, and still hover upon what is to come. *I considered all the living which walk under the sun, with the second child that shall stand up in his stead. Surely, this also is vanity and vexation of spirit.*

You may ask, perhaps, whether it is not better, when things are in a state of uncertain expectation, to divine favourably, and rather to hope than to distrust, since hope purchases more tranquillity of mind. And I certainly hold, that to

possess, during whatever state of uncertainty and expectation, a spirit that is calm and without agitation, through a good government and frame of the mind, is the greatest stability and support of human life. But the tranquillity which depends on hope, I look upon to be light and unstable. Not that it is unsuitable to foresee and presuppose as well good as evil, from a sound and sober forecast ; that we may the better accommodate our actions to the probability of events ; provided this be the work of the understanding and judgment, with a proper bent of the affection. But who was ever thus regulated by hope ? and, after predicting, from a vigilant and firm exercise of his mind, the occurrence of good as most likely to befall him, has not dwelt upon this anticipation itself of the good, and indulged in the thought of it, as in a peaceful dream ? And it is this which renders the mind light and empty, and irregular and wandering. Hope, therefore, is to be altogether rested on the heavenly life to come. Whereas here, the more purified that our sense can be, even now, from the stain and tinct of the imagination, so much the wiser and better shall the soul be ; forbidding us to amend and prolong the hopes of a life, which is so speedily to end.

OF HYPOCRISY.

I will have mercy, and not sacrifice.

All the boast of hypocrites is in the works of the first table of the law ; which is, of the homage due to God. The reason of this is two-fold ; both because works of this class have a greater show of sanctity, and because they give less opposition to their desires. The reproof of the hypocrite, therefore, is to send him from the works of sacrifice to the works of mercy ; whence it is taught, that, *Pure religion and undefiled, with God and the Father, is to visit the fatherless and widow in their affliction* ; and, again, *He that loves not his brother whom he hath seen, how shall he love God, whom he hath not seen ?* Yet some persons of a deep and vain hypocrisy, deceiving themselves, and imagining themselves worthy of a closer converse with God, neglect, as lesser matters, the works of mercy towards their neighbour. And this error, though it gave not rise to the monastic life, (for the beginnings of that were good,) yet it brought on the excess. For it is rightly said, *that the gift of prayer is a great gift in the church* ; and it is conformable to the practice of the church, that there

should be assemblies of men, who, being disengaged from earthly cares, should, by assiduous and devout prayer, solicit God for the state of the church. But with this appointment that hypocrisy borders. Neither is the entire institution, therefore, to be reprobated : but those spirits only which exceed are to be restrained. For both *Enoch*, who walked with God, was a prophet, as it is in *Jude*, and with the fruit of his prophecy endowed the church ; and *John the Baptist*, whom some will have to be the founder of the monastic life, discharged a great ministry, both of prophecy and baptism. For it is to those others, officially ministering to God, that the interrogation applies, *If thou be righteous, what givest thou Him ?* Therefore, works of mercy are the works whereby to discern the hypocrite. But it is the reverse with the heretic. For, as the hypocrite, by a pretended sanctity towards God, cloaks his malice towards men ; so the heretic, beneath a certain morality towards man, covers his blasphemies against God.

OF IMPOSTURE.

Whether we be beside ourselves, it is to God ; or whether we be sober, it is for your cause.

Such is the true image, and true temper, of the man, whose religion is seated in the deep recesses of his heart, and who is the real servant of God. The communion which he holds with God, full of excess, and zeal, and ecstasy. Hence, groans unutterable, and exultations, and raptures of spirit, and agonies. But his communion with man, full of meekness, and soberness, and forbearance. Hence, he *becomes all things to all men*; and the like dispositions. It is otherwise with hypocrites and impostors. For, among the people and the church, they are on fire, and out of measure; and, inspired with a sort of holy rage, put all things in a flame. But, if one should look in upon their solitude, and their private meditations, and converse with God, there he should find them not only cold and spiritless, but full of malice and leaven; so that towards God they are sober, but, towards the people, beside themselves.

OF THE KINDS OF IMPOSTURE.

Avoid profane and vain babblings, and oppositions of science falsely so called. Refuse profane and old wives' fables. Let no man deceive you with vain words.

There is a threefold language, and as it were style, of imposture. The first kind is of those, who, as soon as they have got any materials, frame an art out of them, and impose names of art, and reduce all to distinctions; and from thence draw axioms and conclusions, and dispose of all opposition by means of their questions and answers. Hence the trash and rabble of the schools. The second kind is used by such, as, through vanity of wit, in a sort of sacred poetry, imagine all varieties of examples for the direction of men's minds. Whence the legends of the fathers, and the innumerable fictions of the ancient heretics. The third kind is of those, who fill all things with mysteries, and sounding tales, and allegories, and allusions; which mystical and gnostic sort has been chosen by very many heretics. The first kind ensnares the sense and apprehension of men, the second allures it, and the third stupefies it; but all equally mislead.

OF ATHEISM.

The fool hath said in his heart, there is no God.

First, he has said it in his heart ; for it is not, he hath thought in his heart,—meaning that he has not so much inwardly felt, as he wishes rather to believe, that there is no God ; being a thing which appears convenient for him, and therefore he endeavours by all means to persuade himself of it, and to root it in his mind ; and studies, like some other theory or position, or resolve, to assert, and build, and establish it. But, after all, there remains that spark of early light, by which we acknowledge the Deity, and which we shall in vain struggle utterly to extinguish, nor can pluck out that incentive from the heart. He makes his supposition, therefore, out of the malice of his heart, and not from a native sense and reason ; according to that conceit of the comic poet, *And then did my mind come over to my opinion* ; as if he were himself another than his mind. Thus the atheist rather said in his heart, than thinks in his heart, that there is no God. Secondly, He has said in his heart, not spoken with his mouth. But it is to be observed, that

he has done so through fear of the law and opinion of man ; for, according to what has been said by some one, *It is hard to deny the gods in the assembly of the people, though in a secret company it may be easily spoken.* And, where this fetter and restraint is taken off, there is no heresy which strives more eagerly to spread, and scatter and multiply, than atheism does. For you may see, that those who have plunged into this phrenzy of the mind, are almost perpetually breathing out, and importunately inculcating, the language of atheism : as may be noted in *Lucretius* the Epicurean, who has contrived to introduce, into the midst of almost every other subject, his invectives against religion. The reason seems to be, that the atheist, not able to repose with satisfaction in his own fretting opinions, and not thoroughly believing in his own doctrines, but subject to many inward faintings of mind, seeks to be fostered and supported by the consent of others. For it is truly said, that *he who is over earnest in the justification of an opinion to others has himself a distrust of it.* Third, it is the fool who has said this in his heart: which is most real, not only as he has no knowledge of divine truth, but even in a human sense. For, in the first place, you may see that the dispositions chiefly prone to atheism are for the most part light, and flippant, and for-

ward, and presumptuous; the most opposite, in short, to wisdom and gravity of character. In the second place, among political men, those who have been of the deepest reach, and the most enlarged heart, have upheld religion; not for the purposes of art to the people, but from an inward opinion; as men, that is, who paid the most regard to Providence, and dispensation of events. On the other hand, those who have attributed all to their own contrivance and care, and to immediate and apparent causes, and, as the prophet says, *have sacrificed to their net*, have been puny and peddling politicians, and incapable of greatness in action. And thirdly, in natural knowledge and the like, I affirm that a little philosophy, and a threshold acquaintance with it only, incline the opinions toward atheism; but much natural philosophy, and a deep advance into it, brings the mind back to religion. Therefore, atheism is seen to be convicted of folly and ignorance on all hands; and it is truly *the fool's speech, that there is no God.*

OF HERESIES.

Ye err, not knowing the Scriptures, and the power of God.

This canon is the mother of all canons against heresy. Double cause of error; ignorance of the will of God; and ignorance of, or inattention to, the power of God. The will of God is revealed chiefly by the Scriptures: Search. His power chiefly by the creatures: Contemplate. The fulness of God's power is to be asserted, so that we do not stain his will. The goodness of his will is to be asserted, so that we do not lessen his power. Therefore true religion is situated in the mean, betwixt superstition and superstitious ceremonies on the one hand, and atheism and profane heresies on the other. Superstition, which rejects the light of the Scriptures, and gives itself up to depraved or apocryphal traditions, and new revelations, or false interpretations of the Scriptures, feigns and imagines many things concerning the will of God, which are departures, and foreign from the Scripture. Atheism, again, and blasphemy, rise in rebellion against the power; not believing God's word, which reveals his will, because of unbelief in His power, to whom all

things are possible. But the heresies which flow from this fountain seem to be more grievous than the rest. For so in civil governments, it is more pernicious to lessen the power and majesty of the prince, than to blemish his reputation. But, of these heresies which detract from the power of God, there are, besides simple or absolute atheism, three several steps, and all of them contain this one mystery ; (for every work and instance of Antichrist operates in mystery ; that is to say, under the form of good ;) and it is, that the will of God is by them freed from all aspersion of malice. The first degree is of those who establish two equal principles, mutually repugnant and contrary ; one of good, the other of evil. The second degree, or kind, is of those to whom it appears too great a derogation of the divine majesty, to set up, in opposition to him, a positive and active principle. Accordingly, abjuring such boldness, they nevertheless bring in against God a negative and depriving principle. For they will have it to be an inward, and natural, and subsisting work of matter, and the creatures themselves, that of themselves they should tend and slide back towards confusion and annihilation ; being ignorant that it is no less a work of omnipotence to make nothing from something, than to make something from nothing. The third degree is of

those who narrow and restrict the first opinion, namely, to human actions only, which partake of sin, and which they will have substantially, and without any connexion of causes, to depend on the inward will and choice of man ; thus setting wider bounds to the knowledge than to the power of God ; or rather to that part of the power of God, (for knowledge is itself power,) by which he knows, than to that by which he moves and acts ; so as that he should have a foreknowledge inefficient or inactive, and which does not predestinate and pre-ordain. And this is not unlike the fiction-introduced by *Epicurus* into the philosophy of *Democritus*, by removing fate, and giving place to fortune ; that is to say, the declination of the atom ; which, by the wiser sort, was ever looked upon as a most empty imagination. But, whatever does not depend upon God as the author and beginning, by subordinate connexions and series, that must come to be in the room of God, and a new principle, and a subaltern god. This opinion, therefore, is to be rejected, as an injury to, and a diminution of, the majesty and the power of God. And yet it is most truly said, that *God is not the author of evil*; not because he is not the author, but because it is not evil.

OF THE CHURCH AND THE SCRIPTURES.

Thou shalt keep them secretly in thy tabernacle from the strife of tongues.

Strife of tongues is met every where out of God's tabernacle. Accordingly, wherever you turn, you shall find no end of controversies, till you have betaken yourself thither. You will say, true ; namely, to the unity of the church. But observe, there was an ark in the tabernacle, and in the ark was the testimony, or table of the law. Why do you tell me, then, of the shell of the tabernacle, and not of the kernel of the testimony ? The tabernacle was appointed for preservation and tradition of the testimony. In the same manner, both the keeping and the after tradition of the scriptures are committed to the church ; but the life or soul of the tabernacle is the testimony.

FINIS.



